Showing posts with label inflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label inflation. Show all posts

Saturday, September 18, 2010

Reflection Series: Robert Arnott's magic indexing formula

Robert Arnott, resplendent in a purple-check jacket, purple-striped shirt, and purple-print tie, is regaling his staff with tales of his favorite hobby: chasing solar eclipses from the ice floes of Antarctica to the singing sand mountains of the Gobi Desert. The scene is the ritual daily luncheon inside the cavernous conference room at Research Affiliates, Arnott's fast-growing eight-year-old investment research firm in Newport Beach, Calif. On this sunny Thursday in April, Ph.D.s from as far away as China and Russia sample Turkish cuisine, share ideas for applying game theory to portfolio design, and swap ferocious forehands at the Ping-Pong table. It all has the loose, zany vibe of the cafeteria at a university research lab.

Arnott is well-suited to the role of mad professor. The burly, goateed 55-year-old plows through life with a nonstop enthusiasm that he channels into an assortment of extreme hobbies. He is an avid collector of both the world's fastest vintage motorcycles -- he recently paid $100,000 for a Morbidelli from Italy with a miniature Ferrari engine -- and the graffiti art of Banksy, the phantom underground British painter famed for masking his identity. But Arnott loves nothing more than retelling his eclipse-seeking adventures.

In his rich bass voice, Arnott recounts an epic expedition to Paraguay in the mid-1990s. "We drove nine hours on dusty, bumpy roads to a tiny cow town called Filadelfia," he says. "We hopped the fence of a ranch to see the eclipse, and the owners rushed over to kick us off. When we explained that this happens once every 360 years and only lasts five minutes, they stayed and were mesmerized. A woman cried tears of joy when she saw the moon blot out the sun. I've seen that reaction many times at eclipses."

When he's not circling the globe in search of celestial rapture, Arnott is easily one of the most important figures working in the investment world today. At Research Affiliates he has created a menu of exchange-traded funds, mutual funds, and other offerings that now manage a total of $52 billion (most through indexes licensed to big institutions). But his influence extends well beyond the size of those portfolios.

Arnott's innovative approach to designing and marketing index products has rocked the investment world. "No one is having a bigger impact in reevaluating the full and hidden costs of conventional indexing," says Brent R. Harris, a managing director at nearby Pimco, the $1 trillion money management colossus for whom Arnott directs a family of funds. "He's also creating a better alternative with a proven track record."

Arnott's Big Idea is a concept he calls "fundamental indexing." It's a system that allocates money to stocks based on the economic footprint of the underlying companies rather than by the more common method of market capitalization. As we'll see, it's a near-revolutionary challenge to the accepted wisdom about passive investing. And it has already won over a range of large institutional clients, from the national pension fund of France to CalPERS, the $200 billion retirement fund for California's public employees. "Rob is one of a handful of guys on the cutting edge of investment thinking," says Dan Bienvenue, a senior portfolio manager at CalPERS. "In conventional indexing you're always average. Rob's method has historically beaten the average."

Arnott hasn't just beaten his competitors -- he's thrashed them. Although Research Affiliates manages money directly for select clients, its main business is inventing index funds and licensing them to institutions and brokerage firms, chiefly through index distributor FTSE. Over the past five years Arnott's flagship index, the FTSE RAFI US 1000, offered as a mutual fund (SFLNX) by retail giant Charles Schwab and an ETF (PRF) by Invesco PowerShares, has delivered returns of 4.3% a year through tumultuous markets, beating the S&P 500 (SPX) by 2.4 percentage points annually. And his $21 billion All Asset funds, which invest in a wide variety of securities from around the globe and which Arnott personally manages for Pimco, have garnered 8.6% average annual returns since 2002, vs. 7.5% for the MSCI world equity index -- and have done it with much less volatility.

Those extra percentage points of return look especially enticing right now, for a basic reason: The odds are that the investments of U.S. retirement savers won't live up to their expectations. Most academics agree that with current low bond and dividend yields -- a mere 3.2% and 1.8%, respectively -- traditional portfolios will produce lackluster longterm returns. Arnott argues convincingly that investors employing the standard mix of around 60% stocks and 40% bonds will be stuck with returns in the 5% range for years to come. For the majority of people that figure won't come close to satisfying their income requirements when they reach retirement age in 2030 or 2040. But Arnott swears that the power of fundamental indexing can lift the annual return to around 6.5% for a blend of stocks and bonds.

Has Arnott created a magic market-beating formula? Or is his success a combination of good luck and marketing bravado? Investors are wise to question any solution that pledges the seemingly unachievable blend of higher returns and lower risk. But a detailed examination of the impressive science behind Arnott's creations, how they were developed, and how they performed through one of the most perilous, volatile markets in history gives credence to his claims.

One thing is for sure: Arnott's confidence in himself and his system is absolute. "Most advisers are telling you to build a retirement house with a hammer," he says. "I'm giving you everything from power saws to insulation -- the full tool kit."

Arnott relishes nothing more than the purely intellectual side of investing. He grew up in Claremont, Calif., near Los Angeles, the son of a divinity school professor. "I got my passion for missionary work in investing from my dad," he says. At age 8, he calculated the slope of the earth's surface and arrived at the right number: eight inches per mile. But he abandoned thoughts of becoming an astronomer after attending a six-week physics and astronomy camp while in high school. "The other kids were just too good in math for me to compete," he says. "So I decided to concentrate on finance." At the University of California at Santa Barbara, Arnott majored in economics, math, and computer science. He never earned a doctorate, but he became enthralled with the idea of translating the arcane finance theories he studied into popular investment products.

It was the bursting of the tech bubble in 2001 that gave Arnott the idea for fundamental indexing. At the time Arnott was working for pension fund manager First Quadrant. George Keane, a veteran money manager who served on the investment committee of the giant New York State Common Retirement Fund, kept telling Arnott, with ever rising alarm, that the way index funds were automatically shifting more and more money into wildly overpriced tech stocks was a recipe for disaster. At their peak, tech and telecom shares accounted for an incredible 45% of the capitalization of the S&P 500, while comprising around 15% of the sales and assets.

Keane's fears were justified: The enormous weightings in tech stocks dragged down index funds when the bubble burst. So in 2002, Keane and Marty Leibowitz, chief investment officer of pension fund giant TIAA-CREF, prodded Arnott to find a method for tying holdings in individual stocks to a measure that reflected their size in the economy rather than to prices that swung violently with fads and frenzies. Arnott, who had just founded Research Affiliates, saw an opportunity to gain favor with institutions and individual investors burned by the meltdown. He began to intensively study the performance of portfolios weighted by sales, dividends, and other measures compared with that of cap-weighted funds, such as the Vanguard 500 index fund. One finding absolutely stunned him: From 2000 to 2002, the average stock in the Russell 3000 rose by 20%, while the index fell by 20%.

Arnott quickly concluded that companies weighted by size, using almost any criteria, consistently outperformed capweighted indexes. For his index he settled on a formula that takes the average of four yardsticks: sales, cash flow, book value, and dividends. When companies pay no dividends, RAFI simply averages the other three. Over a 42-year span he found that a hypothetical index weighted by those four measures returned 2.1% more per year than cap-weighted funds. The advantage has been borne out since Arnott launched his indexes in late 2004. And a host of empirical studies by other researchers have proven that fundamental funds consistently beat cap-weighted competitors -- typically by about 2% annually.

Why do fundamental indexes fare far better? The principal reason is that they are regularly rebalancing their holdings by selling expensive stocks and buying cheap ones, relentlessly exploiting what's known as the "value effect." It's well established, both in academic studies and through decades of fund performance, that "value stocks," companies with low price/earnings multiples and low price/book ratios, perform better over time than expensive growth stocks that boast high P/Es. "The market does a good job choosing which companies will grow and which will shrink," says Arnott. "The problem is that investors pay too much for hot, glamorous growth stocks and set the bar too high." In the fundamental index, the rebalancing goes strictly by formula: When a company's market cap jumps faster than its sales or profits, the fund sells just enough of it so that its investment once again reflects not its price but its scale in the economy.

Arnott's critics claim that he's simply repackaging the value effect and calling it something revolutionary. "This is just old wine in new bottles," charges Cliff Asness, chief of hedge fund AQR Capital. "But I like the product." Arnott agrees that the value factor accounts for a lot of his outperformance but maintains his formula for systematically rebalancing into cheap stocks makes his fund far different, and far more original, than a cap-weighted value fund. "We're constantly trading against the market's most extreme bets," says Arnott.

How about costs? Arnott's promises don't count if his extra returns are absorbed by big fees and trading expenses. But Arnott keeps costs down by rebalancing just once a year, in March. The PowerShares FTSE RAFI US 1000, an ETF, carries an expense ratio of 0.39%. The mutual fund version of Arnott's RAFI 1000 offered by Schwab runs 0.35%. Those numbers are far higher than the 0.09% that the iShares S&P 500 ETF (IVV) charges. But they're well below the fees of 2% or even higher for actively managed mutual funds and comparable to the costs for specialized or "enhanced" index products that invest in such niches as small-cap equities or value stocks.

The performance of the RAFI 1000 since the market peak in late 2007 is a fascinating primer in the virtues of fundamental indexing over cap weighting. In general, the bigger the gap in valuation between value stocks and growth stocks, the better that fundamental indexes perform. And by late 2007, after a banner year for growth stocks, there was a deep gulf between the two. When it rebalanced in March 2008, the RAFI gorged on ailing bank stocks such as Bank of America (BAC, Fortune 500) and Citigroup (C, Fortune 500), downtrodden automakers such as Ford (F,Fortune 500), and assorted industrials.

The timing seemed perfect for the fundamental index to beat the traditional cap indexes, even in the dreadful market of 2008. It didn't happen. Growth stocks did poorly, but value stocks fared even worse. The RAFI 1000 lost 40%, vs. 37% for the Russell 1000. "Investors weren't asking when these value companies would rebound but whether they'd survive," recalls Arnott. But the RAFI 1000 didn't blink. In March of 2009, with the market at its nadir, it doubled up on the cheapest stocks just as it had in 2008 -- this time at absolutely rockbottom prices. Says Arnott: "We traded against the greatest fear-driven market of our generation."

The relentless push against the tide paid off when the market roared back, and the downtrodden roared loudest. In early 2009 the RAFI had 12% of its money in stocks selling under $5 a share, compared with 1.5% for the Russell. Over the next year those shares gained an incredible 116%. Consumer discretionary holdings in the RAFI jumped 167%, while the same sector in the Russell increased by 83%. The RAFI's overweight in financials gave it a 26-point edge when those stocks rebounded. All told, from March 2009 to April 2010, the RAFI beat the Russell by 30 points, 84% to 54%.

After the big rally over the past year, stocks would appear to be extremely expensive. But Jason Hsu, one of Arnott's chief lieutenants, says that while tech and health care are carrying prices far in excess of their economic size, a lot of big companies still appear cheap, including financials, industrials, and large retailers. The cap-weighted funds, however, are putting half their money in just one-quarter of the stocks, an unusually large bet on expensive companies. In other words, the market is paying dearly for growth that may not happen. Arnott is confident how things will turn out. "When the gap between the cheap and the expensive is this big," he says, "the fundamental index usually outperforms by more than the traditional two points."

Ironically, despite his incredible success with fundamental indexing, Arnott isn't a big fan of equities -- at least not at these prices. With yields so low, he doesn't think bonds will provide enough of a cushion from the volatility of stocks in years to come. Plus, he fears that the U.S. is headed for a bout of inflation as a result of the Fed's expansionary policies and the mountainous federal debt. "In an inflationary environment," says Arnott, "both stocks and bonds do poorly."

But Arnott has a solution for combating inflation: the Pimco All Asset funds, in which he employs an active rather than a passive strategy. He acts much like a hedge fund manager, handpicking an ever-shifting mix of assets from around the world by using an array of some 40 different Pimco funds. He's the only outside manager Pimco has ever invited to run one of its funds, and he's allowed free rein to buy and sell as he chooses. Right now he's avoiding risky assets like junk bonds in favor of those that should prosper in an inflationary environment. Among them are TIPS, which pay investors an extra yield that corresponds to the rise in the CPI; emerging-markets bonds that do well when raw material prices increase, since developing countries are typically rich in everything from oil to copper; and REITs, which recoup inflation by raising rents on their office towers.

He admits that continuing to deliver the 8.6% average returns the All Asset fund has achieved over the past eight years won't be easy. Not that he's doubting himself. "The only way to get to that 8% or more is to trade opportunistically in and out of the asset classes," says Arnott, with his customary mix of zeal and self-assurance. "I believe I can do it. Most institutional boards can't move that fast."

As much as Arnott believes in the scientific approach of his indexes, he has never been afraid to rely on his own judgment over numerical precision --particularly when it comes to collecting. In 2007 he promised to give his old friend Harry Markowitz, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, an 80-year-old wine on his idol's 80th birthday. But when the day arrived and Arnott handed Markowitz a dusty bottle of Château Cheval Blanc, Markowitz was surprised to see that it was a year too young. "I was confused," says Markowitz. "Then Rob explained, 'I made it a 1928, because 1927 was an inferior year in Bordeaux'." As Arnott knows, not all old wine measures up.


(source: Fortune, May 27, 2010)

Thursday, June 10, 2010

Pento is pessimistic on US recovery

Michael Pento, senior market strategist at Delta Global Advisors, talks with Bloomberg's Susan Li about the outlook for the U.S. economy. Pento, speaking from New York, also discusses Federal Reserve monetary policy and global economy.


(from Bloomberg, June 9, 2010)

Wednesday, December 9, 2009

John Paulson on bonds and equities

John Paulson... super bull? Goodness. To some degree I find "whale watching" a bit overrated, but after being the most obvious winner of the mortgage meltdown, and then piling into gold ahead of a huge run ... Paulson's moves are watched by the investment world very closely. One of the hottest investors on the planet is now chock full of bonds - especially the moral hazard kind (i.e. backstopped by US government). And has his highest net long exposure in "a long time".

No one will be correct forever, but it does make you stand notice...especially since his success is based on actually making big macro calls rather than building an army of computers co-located as close as possible to a stock exchange, so he can surge ahead of your order by 4/1000ths of a second to make mad money.

Via Reuters:
  • Billionaire hedge fund manager John Paulson said on Tuesday he still sees compelling long-term returns in equities even after their sharp run-up this year, while holding no short positions in the credit markets.
  • "Today our net long exposure is perhaps the highest it has ever been in our portfolio," Paulson said during a luncheon presentation at the Japan Society.
  • Paulson, who has run his own hedge fund since 1994, has become a star investor after correctly predicting the sub-prime credit crisis in 2007. That reaped him a $3 billion profit.
Stocks
  • "We still find a lot of compelling long investments on the equity side," he said, citing specifically Bank of America (BAC), U.S. cable-television giant Comcast Corp (CMCSA), and Germany's HeidelbergCement AG (HEIG.DE).
  • Paulson said that at the end of 2008 he viewed the credit correction as having run its course. By April he had poured cash back into the sector. "That is why we don't have any shorts in credit," he said.
  • Based on his estimates of the company's (BAC) earnings potential and the expectation that loan loss provisions will start to drop in 2010, Paulson remained upbeat on the beleaguered bank. "I think the worst is behind us in terms of provisioning," Paulson said, adding: "I would expect provisioning expense to be considerably lower in 2010 versus '09 and again much lower in 2011 versus 2010."
Credit
  • Given his prescient bearish call on mortgage credits, Paulson's views are widely watched for what he has in his $33 billion investment portfolio.
  • He highlighted the attractive yields on credit issued by GMAC due in Sept 2011, the former General Motors automotive financing company that the U.S. government propped up at the end of 2008.
  • By Paulson's thinking, the government involvement is equivalent to an explicit guarantee on GMAC's finances. (you cannot disagree with that) "So instead of buying (a) Treasury bond which yields 84 basis points, I can buy GMAC which is almost, I consider equivalent to a government bond and I can get 11 percent. That is why we have allocated so much money to this particular security," he said.
Inflation
  • Even as credit and equity markets looked attractive, he did reiterate his concerns that over the long-term inflation will be a problem because the government's mountain of stimulus cash will be difficult, politically, to withdraw from the economy.
  • "Therefore we are concerned about high rates of inflation in the future. As an investor I became very concerned about having my assets denominated in U.S. dollars," he said.
  • "So I looked for another currency in which to denominate my assets in. I feel that gold is the best currency." "An increase in the monetary base leads to an increase in the money supply, which then leads to inflation." ('output gap' be damned... the return of the late 70s, ealry 80s only this time no Volcker in charge - only ever easy Ben)
  • Paulson's combined gold and gold-related investments made up more than 46 percent of his firm's holdings at the end of the second quarter of this year. (staggering... just staggering)
Via FT.com
  • "There are lots more long opportunities than short opportunities in the market. Zero interest rates are a huge tonic," he added.
  • "The amount of quantitative easing has stimulated financial markets and will start to appear in the real sector," he said. This is what the US Federal Reserve hopes will happen: that easy money will lead to asset price reflation, lifting confidence and fueling a recovery in the real economy.
  • ... other large positions are in Heidelberg Cement and Renault, an indirect bet on consumer demand in emerging markets.
**********************

Paulson loves gold

[Nov 19, 2009: John Paulson Set to Launch Gold Hedge Fund]
[Aug 12, 2009: John Paulson Makes Bank of America 2nd Largest Holding after Gold]
[May 16, 2009: John Paulson Continues to Pile Into Gold]
[Mar 17, 2009: John Paulson Joins David Einhorn as Gold Bug with Stake in AngloGold Ashanti (AU)]

When not in gold...

[Nov 2, 2009: Conseco - A Chance to Follow John Paulson with Less Hype?]
[Aug 12, 2009: John Paulson Makes Bank of America 2nd Largest Holding after Gold]
[Jul 9, 2009: Latest Picks and Pans from John Paulson and George Soros]
[Jan 31, 2009: Dealbook - John Paulson's Year End Review]
[Nov 18, 2008: Paulson Buying Mortgage Backed Securities]

(from SeekingAlpha, December 9, 2009)

Monday, December 7, 2009

Investment Outlook Bill Gross | December 2009

Anything but .01%

I'm not so much concerned
about the return on my money
as the return of my money.
- Will Rogers, 1933

Toothpicked, straw-hatted Will Rogers was a journalists’ dream, combining common sense with a sense of humor that could trump any newsman of his day, an era that was characterized more by its hopeless and helpless ennui, than its promise for a better tomorrow. During the Great Depression, just breaking even by stuffing your money in a mattress was considered to be a triumph of conservative investment. Likewise, during the past 18 months there have been similar “Will Rogers” moments. Perhaps remarkably, during the week surrounding the Lehman crisis in September of 2008, yours truly frantically called my wife Sue to empty our two local bank accounts into apparently safer Treasury bills. I was not the only PIMCO professional to do so. Preserving principal as opposed to making it grow was the priority of the day – digging a foxhole instead of charging enemy lines seemed paramount.

My how things have changed! With the global financial system apparently stabilized, returns “on” your money are back in vogue, and conservative investors who perhaps appropriately donned a Will Rogers mask nary a fortmonth ago are suddenly waking up to the opportunity cost of 0% cash versus appreciated assets at renewed double-digit annual rates. That 0% yield is not a joke. Almost all money market accounts – totaling over $4 trillion dollars, shown in Chart 1 – yield close to nothing, so close to nothing that I mistakenly did a double take when reviewing my monthly portfolio statement. “Yield on cash,” read the buried line on page 15 of the report, “.01%.”

Well now, I say to myself, this is very interesting from a number of different angles. If I was hoping to double my money, it would take approximately 6,932 years to get there at that rate! Somehow, that wouldn’t satisfy even Will Rogers, who might be choking on his toothpick or at least eating his straw hat in amazement. Secondly, being a savvy professional investor and all, I knew that money market funds actually earned 20 basis points or so on my money, but in this case were allocating a paltry one basis point to me. The words of the Beatles’ “Taxman” immediately popped into mind: “That’s one for you, nineteen for me – TAXMAN!” Ah yes, but in this case it was the Fed and Wall Street that were passing the collection plate. Whether it was really “God’s work,” as Goldman’s Lloyd Blankfein asserted, I wasn’t quite sure. If there was a “temple” in the vicinity I was thinking that God should be driving the moneychangers out as opposed to inviting them in for a pep talk.

Ah, but this is not a vindictive diatribe, although to me, money changers resemble Mammon more than archangels, and they all make too much money, including PIMCO. My point is to recognize, and to hope that you recognize, that an effective zero percent interest rate, as a price for hiding in a foxhole, is prohibitive. Like the American doughboys near France’s future Maginot line in WWI – slumping day after day in a muddy, rat-infested pit – when the battalion commander finally blew his whistle to charge the enemy lines, it probably was accompanied by some sense of relief; anything, anything but this! Anything but .01%!

Recently, approximately $20 billion a week has been exiting those payless, seemingly godless funds in search of a higher-yielding Nirvana. Yet, as Will Rogers knew, and Lehman Brothers demonstrated to another generation, the pain of the foxhole can immediately transition to the dodging of real bullets on the investment battlefield. Moving out on the risk asset spectrum has worked wonders since March of this year, but it comes with the risk of principal loss – failing to receive the return of your money. When viewed from 30,000 feet, there is even a systemic risk that new asset bubbles are in the formative stages – perhaps because of the .01%. Gold at $1,130 an ounce, global equity markets up 60-70% from their 2009 lows, a cascading dollar now 15% lower against a basket of global currencies just 12 months ago, oil at 80 bucks, mortgage rates at 4% thanks to a $1 trillion dollar credit card from the Fed; the list goes on. The legitimate question of the day is, “Is a 0% funds rate creating the next financial bubble, and if so, will the Fed and other central banks raise rates proactively – even in the face of double-digit unemployment?” As Chicago Fed President Charles Evans said in a recent speech, “This notion is often described as an imperative to ‘lean against a bubble,’ meaning that a central bank should act to lower asset prices that by historical standards seem unusually high.”

Yet even if the Fed and others are becoming sensitized to the dangers of up as opposed to exclusively down asset prices, it would seem that now is not the time to be affirming their bipolarity. Asset price rebounds (aside from the historic highs in gold) have followed even more dramatic slumps. A 60% rise in the stock market does not compensate for a 60% decline. Strangely enough, investors are still out 36% of their money once this down elevator/up elevator example plays out. And the simple analysis is that the private sector has still not taken the baton from government policymakers: There has been no public/private sector handoff. Bank lending is still contracting in the U.S. and weak in most other G-10 countries. Unemployment is still rising and approaching historic (ex-Depression) cyclical peaks.

Raise interest rates with 15 million jobless and 25 million part-time working Americans? All because gold is above $1,100? You must be joking or smoking – something. We will need another 12 months of 4-5% nominal GDP growth before Bernanke and company dare lift their heads out of the 0% foxhole – mini-bubbles or not. Instead, the heavy lifting or the charging of enemy lines in the case of this metaphor will likely be done by other central banks – already in Australia and Norway. In addition, and importantly, China may abandon its dollar peg within six months’ time and with it, its own easy monetary policy that has fostered more significant mini-bubbles of lending and asset appreciation on the Chinese mainland. With renewed upward appreciation of the yuan may come potentially volatile global asset price reactions to the downside – higher Treasury yields, and lower stock prices – which the Fed must surely be leery of before making any upward move, of its own, and before moving on, let me state the obvious, but often forgotten bold-face fact: The Fed is trying to reflate the U.S. economy. The process of reflation involves lowering short-term rates to such a painful level that investors are forced or enticed to term out their short-term cash into higher-risk bonds or stocks. Once your cash has recapitalized and revitalized corporate America and homeowners, well, then the Fed will start to be concerned about inflation – not until. To date that transition is incomplete, mainly because mortgage refinancing and the purchase of new homes is being thwarted by significant changes in down payment requirements. The Treasury as well, has a significant average life extension of its own debt to foist on investors before the Fed can raise short-term Fed Funds.

OK, so where does that leave you, the individual investor, the small saver who is paying the price of the .01%? Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. Do you buy the investment grade bond market with its average yield of 3.75% (less than 3% after upfront fees and annual expenses at most run-of-the-mill bond funds)? Do you buy high yield bonds at 8% and assume the risk of default bullets whizzing at you? Or 2% yielding stocks that have already appreciated 65% from the recent bottom, which according to some estimates are now well above their long-term PE average on a cyclically adjusted basis? Two suggestions. First, as emphasized in prior Investment Outlooks, the New Normal is likely to be a significantly lower-returning world. Diminished growth, deleveraging, and increased government involvement will temper profits and their eventual distribution to investors in the form of dividends and interest. As banks, auto companies and other corporate models become more regulated and therefore more like utilities and less like Boardwalk and Park Place, they will return less.

Which brings up the second point. If companies are going to move toward a utility model, why suffer the transformational revaluation risk of equities with such a low 2% dividend return? Granted, Warren Buffet went all-in with the Burlington Northern, but in doing so he admitted it was a 100-year bet with a modest potential return. Still, Warren had to do something with his money; the .01% was eating a hole in his pocket too. Let me tell you what I’m doing. I don’t have the long-term investment objectives of Berkshire Hathaway, so I’m sort of closer to an average investor in that regard. If that’s the case, I figure, why not just buy utilities if that’s what the future American capitalistic model is likely to resemble. Pricewise, they’re only halfway between their 2007 peaks and 2008 lows – 25% off the top, 25% from the bottom. Their growth in earnings should mimic the U.S. economy as they always have, and most importantly they yield 5-6% not .01%! In a low growth environment, it seems to me that a company’s stock should yield more than its less risky debt, and many utilities provide just that opportunity. Utilities and even quasi-utility telecommunication companies now yield between 5 and 6%, whereas their 10- and 30-year bonds yield less and at a higher tax rate to you the investor.

So come on you frustrated Will Rogers lookalikes. Join the wimp who pulled his money out of the bank just 14 months ago. Look at your monthly statement, zero in on that .01% yield and say to yourself, “I’m as mad as hell, and I’m just not going to take this anymore!” You can’t buy the Burlington Northern – Warren Buffett has scooped that up – and most other choices offer tempting returns, but potential bullets as well. Buy some utilities. It may not be as much fun as running a railroad, but at least you’ll know who to call if the lights go out.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

(from pimco.com, December 2009)

Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Dollar's Hit a "Major Bottom," Prechter Says: Why That's Not Such Good News

by Peter Gorenstein in Newsmakers, Commodities

Forget all the talk about the dollar being in terminal decline. The recent rally in the greenback is for real, says Robert Prechter, president of Elliott Wave International. The man who correctly predicted the 1987 crash and last year's peak in oil prices now says we're "going to be up for a year or two in the dollar."

Reuters and other mainstream news outlets attribute the recent uptick in the dollar versus other major currencies to an improving economy signaled by Friday's "stronger-than-expected U.S. jobs numbers." Prechter, ever the contrarian, says the U.S. dollar has put in a major bottom but not for the reasons everyone else is pointing to.

Prechter points to three factors:

  • The Elliott Wave Pattern: Without getting too technical (for your sake and mine) Elliott Wave Theory looks at markets cycles in terms of wave structures that come in five parts. Five waves up followed by five waves down. Well, according to Prechter's research the pattern confirms we recently hit the fifth wave down. Next stop: up.
  • Sentiment has reached an extreme: "The Dollar Sentiment Index for the Dollar Index reports just 3% bulls among traders, an extreme level only five times in the past 20 years, usually near an important low," Prechter wrote on Aug. 5. "The last time we saw readings like this was March-July 2008, just before the dollar soared." In other words, the "short the dollar" trade is overly crowded.
  • The biggest risk to the economy is deflation not inflation: As he lays out in his book, Conquer the Crash, Prechter thinks the bursting of the latest bubble will lead to a major economic depression.
As we discuss in forthcoming segments, this good news for the dollar spells bad news for most other asset classes including stocks, commodities and real estate.

Saturday, May 16, 2009

We can probably expect 10-year Treasurys to yield more than 6% a year from now.

The principal cold gale causing green shoots to wither will probably be the inexorable rise in long-term interest rates. This has already begun; the 10-year Treasury yield is up from its low of 2.07% in December to around 3.3% today. However, the enormous Treasury financing requirement and the increasing visibility of inflationary signals will cause yields to go much higher. In the 1990s, when average inflation was 2.9%, the same level as the recently announced first-quarter GDP deflator, and the federal budget deficit averaged a mere 2.3% of GDP, the 10-year Treasury yield averaged 6.67%. That level may seem very high currently, but in fact is likely to be passed fairly rapidly, on the way to Treasury bond yields of 10% or more as deficits and inflation provide a howling adverse gale for the T-bond market. The rise in interest rates will be prolonged and initially quite slow, but we can probably expect 10-year Treasurys to yield more than 6% a year from now.

If rising interest rates are the gale causing green shoots to wither, inflation will be the frost causing them to die. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has enjoyed a period in the public eye, even before his January 2006 ascension as Fed chairman, largely punctuated by self-delusion on an extraordinary scale. It began with his discovery of a hitherto undetected dire deflationary threat in 2002, continued with his announcement of the "Great Moderation" in February 2004, just as his lax monetary policy was sending housing policies into orbit, continued with his accusation that evil Asian savers had caused the 2007-08 explosion in commodity prices and has now settled into an indelible conviction that, however "unorthodox" and Weimarite his monetary policies may be, inflation is far less of a danger than deflation.

It will be a race between soaring interest rates and grimly rising inflation to kill the green shoots of recovery and plunge the U.S. economy into renewed downturn. Both factors will reinforce each other as buyers of Treasury bonds, appalled by the price declines in their holdings, will come to realize that inflation as well as soaring interest rates has made long-term Treasurys the ultimate sucker's bet. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, will no doubt be especially withering in his condemnation, discovering a hitherto little-known treatise on sound monetary policy in his copy of the "Thoughts of Mao Zedong."

(from Prudent Bear, May 11, 2009)

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Allan Meltzer on the Coming Inflation

Allan Meltzer, the Fed historian and professor of political economy at Carnegie Mellon University, talks with Bloomberg's Kathleen Hays about U.S. inflation risk and Federal Reserve policy. Meltzer also discusses the U.S. housing market and the outlook for banks. They talk at a conference of the National Association of Realtors in Washington.

Housing market hasn't bottomed... I am worried about inflation two years from now... Fed should slow rate at which it increases the money growth

Sunday, January 25, 2009

Bill Gross on Bond Investments and Inflation

The most important info I heard today on Bloomberg was the opinion of Bill Gross on bond investments. I invest in PIMCO Total Return Fund (PTTRX) managed by Bill Gross and follow Bill Gross' commentaries.

It's crucial to know when to decrease the bond investments because of creeping inflation. Bill Gross estimates that the US may start seeing the signs of inflation only in the end of 2010. The most important signs of inflation in his view are employment data and industrial capacity utilization.

Given the prospect of US government printing money to finance its projects, hearing that the inflation is not expected till the end of 2010 is reassuring.