Showing posts with label fabrice tourre. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fabrice tourre. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 12, 2010

Blaming Merrill Might Set Goldman Sachs Free: Michael Lewis

To: Lloyd Blankfein Re: Winning at Ethics, the Goldman Way

I have reviewed no less than seven times your entire episode on Charlie Rose.

Your artful simplicity, studied humility and former hairline all positively radiated against the set’s dark background.

As one of my lesser colleagues on the desk marveled, “Lloyd seemed almost human: Why?” To which I replied, evenly: “because he finally read my last memo.”

Of course there was no reason you should look to one of your own traders for advice. But now that you have, we must proceed quickly. American public opinion is volatile; our exposure to it is peaking, and it will be more difficult than usual to create the illusion for American mortals (or as we like to call them, “The Morts”) that our business is in their interest, much less that we share anything in common.

This time, please, do not wait five months to internalize my new action items. They are:

No. 1: Implicate the rest of Wall Street, as quickly as possible.

It’s always unnatural to hear the name of Goldman Sachs in the same sentence as Deutsche Bank, much less Merrill Lynch. We must put aside our revulsion. The American people might enjoy seeing one firm being driven out of business by a criminal investigation. They’re less likely to allow for the destruction of every big Wall Street firm. They just forked over trillions to keep them afloat.

Delicate Decency

This job of putting our behavior in a new context -- comparing it not to some broad universal standard of “decency” but to Wall Street standards -- must be done delicately.

For example I was once hauled before a second-grade teacher and simply shouted, “You ill-paid, third-rate moron! I did nothing worse than what every other kid was doing! It is illogical not to punish them, too!”

The outburst did nothing to alleviate my situation, and probably made it more difficult than it needed to be for me to gain entry to Princeton. But the episode taught me one of the central tenets of the Goldman Way: far better to rig a system than to fight it.

Helpful Walks

Our public relations staff might quietly and helpfully walk even hostile reporters through some of the deals created by these other firms. Ditto our lawyers in their meetings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

No. 2: Continue to use Warren Buffett, but don’t forget to pay him.

When Warren said that stuff the other day about wishing you had a twin brother so he could employ you both, he didn’t mean it as a sign of his undying admiration for you.

Remember: He said almost exactly the same sort of things about John Gutfreund, after Gutfreund had given him a sweet deal to rescue Salomon Brothers from oblivion. The moment Warren was forced to choose between Gutfreund and his money, he chose his money.

Don’t force him to make that choice. If you want more loud character references from Warren Buffett (you do) you must insure that he continues to think of you as profitable.

I don’t know if there are ways Goldman Sachs might simply give money to Berkshire Hathaway for free, but we should explore the possibility.

Hide the Props

No. 3: Hide, and hide from, the prop group.

If you must be seen in public with Goldman employees, make sure they are bankers and brokers, and not our proprietary traders. You did an excellent job on Charlie Rose of making it seem the prop group didn’t even exist.

We were mere “market makers” who helped our customers “get the risk they wanted.”

At the same time, but for different reasons, you should limit your private interaction with the prop traders, especially Jonathan Egol.

The SEC’s complaint focused on one of Jonathan’s Abacus deals and yet failed even to mention Jonathan. Instead they fingered the French guy.

At first I took it as just another sign of Mort stupidity. But now that the Justice Department has gotten involved, and is combing through all the Abacus deals, I wonder. Why is no one yet talking about Jonathan? Why is no one making noises about the deals structured for Jonathan -- and not John Paulson -- to short them? Is it possible that Jonathan has been helping them to understand our business? Just saying...

Our French Problem

No. 4: You need to address our French problem.

In a matter of weeks Fabrice Tourre has gone from non- entity to a potential asset (a “rogue trader” who might have gone quietly so that the firm might survive) to a huge liability (hero on Wall Street, who somehow has managed to portray himself as both a religious martyr and a mere cog in our machine.)

Going forward I suggest that our personnel department reexamine the French male’s ability to subordinate himself. In English there is no “I” in team. It turns out that the French use a different word: equipe.

Our international people should have known this. At the very least they should have been queasy about hiring guys who look as if they’d rather be wearing espadrilles.

‘Things Like Ethics’

No. 5: Be careful not to say or do anything now that will constrain our ability, after this crisis has passed, to do whatever we want.

The other day, on your emergency conference call with our customers, you said that you wanted Goldman to be seen as a “leader in things like ethics.”

I couldn’t have put it better myself. If in the future we fail to be a leader in ethics we can point to your statement as evidence that we never intended to be a leader in ethics, merely in “things like ethics.”

To that end, I intend to compile a list of things like ethics, in which we might strive to be a leader, without risk to our profitability.

(Michael Lewis, most recently author of the best-selling “The Big Short,” is a columnist for Bloomberg News. The opinions expressed are his own.)

(from Bloomberg, May 12, 2010)

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

[Abacus] A Goldman blogger round-up

The weekend produced a veritable Eyjafjallajökull ash cloud of blogging and bloviating on the SEC’s filing on Friday against Goldman Sachs and its structured products trader Fabrice Tourre. Here’s the best we’ve read.

Getting shorty in CDOs

First — the key SEC charge is that Tourre allowed John Paulson to pre-select bonds in a proposed CDO and then to short them, without informing its other investors, ACA Capital included.

In a stand-out post, Steve Waldman questions the role of shorting in CDOs overall, arguing that CDOs are more akin to securities than derivatives, in terms of disclosure:

Investors in Goldman’s deal reasonably thought that they were buying a portfolio that had been carefully selected by a reputable manager whose sole interest lay in optimizing the performance of the CDO. They no more thought they were trading “against” short investors than investors in IBM or Treasury bonds do. In violation of these reasonable expectations, Goldman arranged that a party whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of investors would have significant influence over the selection of the portfolio. Goldman misrepresented that party’s role to the manager and failed to disclose the conflict of interest to investors. That’s inexcusable. Was it illegal? I don’t know, and I don’t care.

In a separate post, Steve mulls a more abstract view of whether Goldman did indeed act as a ’secret agent’ for one client to the disadvantage of another.

And was that pragmatic, let alone legal?After reading the filing, Bond Girl is cutting:

Seriously, why the hell would anyone want to be a client of Goldman Sachs after reading this?

Why would you work with a firm where employees mock the transactions they are arranging for you to purchase in emails?

Why would you work with a firm that would let someone that it knows is going to have a short position in the investment – because it helped them attain it – help structure that investment for you?

Why would you work with a firm that sees your multi-million-dollar business relationship as nothing more than collateral damage in its ultimate pursuit of fees?

This is not what investment bankers do. This is what backstabbing sociopaths do.

_____________________________

ACA and due diligence

Meanwhile, Henry Blodget and Felix Salmon squared off over whether Paulson’s prior involvement did indeed materially affect ACA’s position — or whether a ’sophisticated investor’ should have known better. Quite the ding-dong, this.

Blodget argues that there is a difference between control and influence:

Paulson did NOT have control over which securities were selected for the CDO.

This is critical. It’s also a fact that is clearly visible in the evidence the SEC provided.

The firm that DID have control over which securities were selected, ACA, was a highly sophisticated firm that analyzed securities like this for a living. It had FULL CONTROL over which securities were included in the CDO. We know this because, of the 123 bonds that Paulson proposed for the CDO, ACA only included 55 of them. In other words, ACA dinged more than half of the bonds Paulson wanted in the CDO, presumably because they did not meet ACA’s quality hurdle.

Now, did Paulson influence which securities ACA selected? Yes, he probably did. But any time someone says or does anything with respect to a security, there are lots of things that influence decisions.

Salmon calls this argument ‘pathetically unconvincing’:

Let’s remember here that in the end there were 90 securities in the CDO. Of those 90, it seems that 55 were chosen by Paulson. In other words, more than 60% of the securities in the CDO were picked, essentially, out of a stacked deck. It didn’t matter which securities ACA chose; Paulson had come up with his longlist of 123 securities precisely because all of them were particularly toxic. That’s a material fact which, if ACA had known it, would surely have sufficed to get them to exit the deal entirely.

Paul Kedrosky has the original flipbook for the ill-starred CDO, for reference.

Pivoting from that flipbook, Erik Gerding of The Conglomerate zeroes in on the SEC’s case over disclosure:

My guess is that a reasonable investor would indeed want to know that Paulson was involved in selecting the deck. What’s the support for this beyond the SEC’s Complaint? Look at the “flipbook” for the transaction provided to investors by Goldman…

It goes on at length of why ACA is a good collateral manager for the CDO. On p. 27, it includes a bullet point “Alignment of Economic Interest.” The SEC complaint zooms in on this little nugget (see Complaint Para. 38). (Note to law students: bullet points in “powerpoint” style are not only bad devices to communicate ideas, they have some itty bitty securities law problems when used to market securities. If you can’t formulate something in a complete sentence, try again.) Nowhere does the flipbook mention that the Paulson hedge fund was involved in selecting the collateral for the CDO.

But it’s far from a slam dunk, he notes. Still, Salmon has raised a wider set of questions about the Abacus deal — so this aspect will no doubt run and run as a point of bloggy contention.


(from FT, Apr 19 2010)

Profile: Fabrice Tourre, Goldman Sachs

David Teather

Goldman Sachs is standing by its man – so far. The investment bank has said an internal inquiry cleared Fabrice Tourre, the 31-year-old at the centre of fraud allegations, of any wrongdoing. He was apparently not at work today, at Goldman's Fleet Street offices, but the bank said it was a "personal decision", adding he has not been suspended.

But if he does return to work, Tourre will find it difficult to live down the moniker of "Fabulous Fab" after describing himself as such in an already infamous e-mail sent to a friend, in which he boasted with a flourish that he would be a "survivor … of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implication of those monstrosities (sic)!!!".

French-born Tourre has a mathematics degree from the Ecole Centrale in Paris, one of the top universities in France, and a master's in operations research from Stanford University.

He joined Goldman in New York in 2001 and quietly worked his way up through the firm, to become a vice-president on the structured product trading desk, where he helped create the Abacus 2007-AC1 CDO, packed with toxic sub-prime mortgages.

He moved to London in late 2008 where he is now an executive director, a title that belies his relatively junior position in the bank.

Little else is known about Tourre. One report described him as "a slight man with a flair for salesmanship". The Daily Mail suggested he lives in a £3,000-a-month apartment, claims to come from a prominent French family, earns £1.5m a year and is something of a party animal.

He did at least have a clear understanding of the perils of the housing boom. In his e-mail of January 2007, he warned the "whole building is about to collapse anytime now", just three months ahead of closing the Abacus deal that is now under the microscope. In fact the New York Times cited a former colleague who said Tourre was "way ahead" of his time and had been predicting a crash as early as 2005.

(from guardian.co.uk, April 19, 2010)

Leaked Goldman Presentation on Abacus Trade

Yves Smith, creator of Naked Capitalism: "We received a copy of the document via e-mail and assumed this is being leaked broadly (which begs the question of whether this was by happenstance or deliberate. The proximity to the filing of the suit suggests the latter). Richard Smith published it on ScribD:"

Abacus-2007-AC1-INDICATIVE TERMS

Yves Smith: "Several items jump out.

First is the unseemly number of pages devoted to touting ACA’s expertise and deliberate screening process, namely pages 20 to 48 and 57 through 63. ACA presumably provided all the material in this section, which is misleading, but since it was for the most part not incorporated in the offering documents, ACA would appear not to be liable (plus Goldman is still on the hook, since it was making representations re ACA’s process and procedures). The amount of information provided gives further support to the idea that the caliber and independence of the collateral manager was an important consideration for prospective investors in the deal.

Second is the long list of contacts on page 65, including Jonathan Egol (who spearheaded the Abacus program) and Testuya Ishikawa (who has left the industry and wrote the book How I Caused the Credit Crunch). As many have remarked, the singling out of Tourre seems odd.

Goldman released a short statement today on the pending suit and has provided a longer statement in its defense. Its basic arguments are:

1. Goldman lost money on the deal. Hhm, is that because the losses were larger than the guarantee provided by ACA on the super senior tranche? (The statement “ACA was the biggest investor” presumably translates into “ACA insured the super senior tranche” but to the extent the insurance failed, Goldman would be exposed). That would be a failure of risk management (as in GS expected the deal to fail, but its hedge was insufficient).

2. Goldman made adequate disclosure. We’ll see how that contention holds up as more information comes out."

(from Naked Capitalism, April 16, 2010)