Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Goldman Sachs soap opera

As GS soap opera plays out, here is what I think.

Greg Smith's "Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs" parallels Mark Zuckerberg's blog post after Jessica Alona  broke up with him. Mark called her "bitch" in his blog. Glaring lack of Grace.

The guy worked at GS for almost 12 years and took full monetary advantage of GS's culture. Since he doesn't return his bonuses, he is as obnoxious as the rest of GS managers he describes.

Now, what about Wall street at large? 

Part of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was due to the rating agencies rating risky bonds as AAA bonds pursuing profits and competing with each other for the clients-bond issuers. They, in effect, were taking advantage of the pension funds buying these bonds based on the AAA rating. I asked the head of the research of one of the rating agency about that. He answered that those who buy the bonds have to do their own research. Sounds similar to the Blankfein's response to why GS was selling to its clients the tools which were not appropriate for them. Blankfein said that the clients buy  instruments  with the predefined risk profile to play certain role in their portfolio and that's, in the end, client's decision which instruments to buy.

The broader part of the financial landscape is institutional wealth management based on the model portfolios. The clients are duped to believe that there is scientific prove behind the models. They are not told that the investment theory cannot be proven experimentally, and, therefore, it's not a scientific theory. The wealth management is a huge industry swallowing one third of the client's money over the thirty-forty years of the client's portfolio management.

How exactly is GS different? The level of cynicism?

Friday, September 16, 2011

Goldman Sachs Closing Global Alpha Quant Fund

Goldman Sachs is shuttering a well-known hedge fund that relies on computer-driven trading strategies after the portfolio rang up a hefty loss this year.- Goldman's Global Alpha fund down 13 pct year-to-date, while many other quant funds performing well.

Goldman Sachs is shuttering a well-known hedge fund that relies on computer-driven trading strategies after the portfolio rang up a hefty loss this year. Goldman told investors in the roughly $1.6 billion Global Alpha fund the news Thursday, one day after it announced a management shake-up at the fund that had been the crown jewel of its quantitative trading business. The fund will be closed in the next few weeks.

Global Alpha had tumbled 13 percent by early September, delivering a far worse performance than other hedge funds that rely on computer programs to quickly take advantage of opportunities in the market, people familiar with the number said. These types of funds are supposed to move quickly in and out of stocks, bonds, currencies and other assets and exit positions before losses accrue.

This is the second time in four years the Global Alpha fund -- once one of Goldman's biggest with $12 billion in assets -- has suffered big losses and its performance raises questions about the ability of Goldman Sachs to manage quantitative strategies for its wealthy clients. In fact, people familiar with Goldman Sachs have said the company's decision to liquidate Global Alpha signals its decision to exit quantitative hedge fund strategies altogether. The firm still manages billions in quantitative mutual funds.

Even though Goldman's Global Alpha fund is in the red, most other other quantitative hedge funds are up or are flat for the year. The average quant fund is down less than 1 percent over that period, according to performance tracking service Hedge Fund Research Inc. Mark Carhart, the man who managed the Global Alpha fund with Raymond Iwanowski for more than a decade until 2009, has gained 7 percent net of fees this year at his new hedge fund Kepos Capital, a person familiar with his numbers said.

The new turmoil at Global Alpha comes almost four years to the day after the fund lost 22.5 percent in August 2007, during the early days of the financial crisis. Those losses prompted investors to pull money out.

Even though the fund's performance steadied with a 4 percent gain in 2008 and raced ahead with a 30 percent increase in 2009, assets never recovered. By the time Carhart and Iwanowski left in 2009, the fund had shrunk to $4 billion from its $12 billion peak. Soon after the pair retired, assets shriveled further to about $2 billion. The fund neither gained nor lost money last year, delivering a zero return.

The quantitative group has been beset by departures for some time. More than two dozen left this year alone, people familiar with the numbers said. On Wednesday, Goldman Sachs Asset Management sent a letter to Global Alpha investors notifying them that Katinka Domotorffy, the head of the group's quantitative investment strategies, would retire at year's end. The letter, a copy of which was obtained by Reuters, did not discuss the poor performance of the Global Alpha fund.

What may have hit the Goldman fund especially hard were the unexpected stock market sell offs in early August and recent currency market fluctuations in the wake of the Swiss National Bank's decision to halt the rise of the Swiss franc, people familiar with the fund's models said. Andrew Schneider, president and CEO of Global Hedge Fund Advisors, said the first half of September has been brutal for some large hedge funds, due to unpredictable moves in market direction.

"The volatility has been so high; if you're wrong, especially if you're using margin or leverage, your returns are going to be extremely poor," said Schneider.

Other quantitative hedge funds, however, fared better. James Simons' Renaissance Technologies' Renaissance Institutional Equities fund has gained more than 25 percent this year, said a person familiar with the fund. Another quant fund, QuantZ Capital Management, for instance, is up 12.8 percent through Sept. 6, according to a letter sent to investors.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

GS on the state of the markets


GS_StateOf the Markets

Thursday, August 25, 2011

Solution to Deficit: Global Fiscal Adjustment

Goldman Sachs Global ECS Research stresses that large fiscal adjustments are required around the world, particularly in the advanced economies. The IMF projects an average primary deficit (excluding interest) of 5.3% of GDP in the advanced economies in 2011...

GS Global Econ Paper Aug19 2011

Wednesday, May 12, 2010

Blaming Merrill Might Set Goldman Sachs Free: Michael Lewis

To: Lloyd Blankfein Re: Winning at Ethics, the Goldman Way

I have reviewed no less than seven times your entire episode on Charlie Rose.

Your artful simplicity, studied humility and former hairline all positively radiated against the set’s dark background.

As one of my lesser colleagues on the desk marveled, “Lloyd seemed almost human: Why?” To which I replied, evenly: “because he finally read my last memo.”

Of course there was no reason you should look to one of your own traders for advice. But now that you have, we must proceed quickly. American public opinion is volatile; our exposure to it is peaking, and it will be more difficult than usual to create the illusion for American mortals (or as we like to call them, “The Morts”) that our business is in their interest, much less that we share anything in common.

This time, please, do not wait five months to internalize my new action items. They are:

No. 1: Implicate the rest of Wall Street, as quickly as possible.

It’s always unnatural to hear the name of Goldman Sachs in the same sentence as Deutsche Bank, much less Merrill Lynch. We must put aside our revulsion. The American people might enjoy seeing one firm being driven out of business by a criminal investigation. They’re less likely to allow for the destruction of every big Wall Street firm. They just forked over trillions to keep them afloat.

Delicate Decency

This job of putting our behavior in a new context -- comparing it not to some broad universal standard of “decency” but to Wall Street standards -- must be done delicately.

For example I was once hauled before a second-grade teacher and simply shouted, “You ill-paid, third-rate moron! I did nothing worse than what every other kid was doing! It is illogical not to punish them, too!”

The outburst did nothing to alleviate my situation, and probably made it more difficult than it needed to be for me to gain entry to Princeton. But the episode taught me one of the central tenets of the Goldman Way: far better to rig a system than to fight it.

Helpful Walks

Our public relations staff might quietly and helpfully walk even hostile reporters through some of the deals created by these other firms. Ditto our lawyers in their meetings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

No. 2: Continue to use Warren Buffett, but don’t forget to pay him.

When Warren said that stuff the other day about wishing you had a twin brother so he could employ you both, he didn’t mean it as a sign of his undying admiration for you.

Remember: He said almost exactly the same sort of things about John Gutfreund, after Gutfreund had given him a sweet deal to rescue Salomon Brothers from oblivion. The moment Warren was forced to choose between Gutfreund and his money, he chose his money.

Don’t force him to make that choice. If you want more loud character references from Warren Buffett (you do) you must insure that he continues to think of you as profitable.

I don’t know if there are ways Goldman Sachs might simply give money to Berkshire Hathaway for free, but we should explore the possibility.

Hide the Props

No. 3: Hide, and hide from, the prop group.

If you must be seen in public with Goldman employees, make sure they are bankers and brokers, and not our proprietary traders. You did an excellent job on Charlie Rose of making it seem the prop group didn’t even exist.

We were mere “market makers” who helped our customers “get the risk they wanted.”

At the same time, but for different reasons, you should limit your private interaction with the prop traders, especially Jonathan Egol.

The SEC’s complaint focused on one of Jonathan’s Abacus deals and yet failed even to mention Jonathan. Instead they fingered the French guy.

At first I took it as just another sign of Mort stupidity. But now that the Justice Department has gotten involved, and is combing through all the Abacus deals, I wonder. Why is no one yet talking about Jonathan? Why is no one making noises about the deals structured for Jonathan -- and not John Paulson -- to short them? Is it possible that Jonathan has been helping them to understand our business? Just saying...

Our French Problem

No. 4: You need to address our French problem.

In a matter of weeks Fabrice Tourre has gone from non- entity to a potential asset (a “rogue trader” who might have gone quietly so that the firm might survive) to a huge liability (hero on Wall Street, who somehow has managed to portray himself as both a religious martyr and a mere cog in our machine.)

Going forward I suggest that our personnel department reexamine the French male’s ability to subordinate himself. In English there is no “I” in team. It turns out that the French use a different word: equipe.

Our international people should have known this. At the very least they should have been queasy about hiring guys who look as if they’d rather be wearing espadrilles.

‘Things Like Ethics’

No. 5: Be careful not to say or do anything now that will constrain our ability, after this crisis has passed, to do whatever we want.

The other day, on your emergency conference call with our customers, you said that you wanted Goldman to be seen as a “leader in things like ethics.”

I couldn’t have put it better myself. If in the future we fail to be a leader in ethics we can point to your statement as evidence that we never intended to be a leader in ethics, merely in “things like ethics.”

To that end, I intend to compile a list of things like ethics, in which we might strive to be a leader, without risk to our profitability.

(Michael Lewis, most recently author of the best-selling “The Big Short,” is a columnist for Bloomberg News. The opinions expressed are his own.)

(from Bloomberg, May 12, 2010)

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

Paolo Pellegrini's Testimony Could Undercut SEC Charge Against Goldman

CNBC's Steve Liesman reports: The SEC has testimony from Paolo Pellegrini, who negotiated the deal with ACA, that could contradict SEC's claims against Goldman Sachs. Paolo Pellegrini, ex right hand of Paulson, told ACA that he chose the portfolio of CDOs based on the low FICA score and high debt-to-value ratio. His intent to short the portfolio was clear and hard to miss.

Watch Steve Liesman discussing the case

Background:
Pellegrini is the Rome-born analyst who helped hedge fund operator John Paulson to make a ton of money on the subprime crash in 2007 and 2008. Pellegrini and his colleagues crunched tons of U.S. mortgage data, concluded that housing prices were due for a collapse, and invested accordingly. Paulson made over $3.5 billion on the trade. Pellegrini, is now investing his personal money via his firm PSQR Capital.
Paulson Protege Pellegrini on Bernanke's Fed: "Sheer Lunacy" Posted by: Peter Carbonara on November 16, 2009

Tuesday, April 20, 2010

[Abacus] A Goldman blogger round-up

The weekend produced a veritable Eyjafjallajökull ash cloud of blogging and bloviating on the SEC’s filing on Friday against Goldman Sachs and its structured products trader Fabrice Tourre. Here’s the best we’ve read.

Getting shorty in CDOs

First — the key SEC charge is that Tourre allowed John Paulson to pre-select bonds in a proposed CDO and then to short them, without informing its other investors, ACA Capital included.

In a stand-out post, Steve Waldman questions the role of shorting in CDOs overall, arguing that CDOs are more akin to securities than derivatives, in terms of disclosure:

Investors in Goldman’s deal reasonably thought that they were buying a portfolio that had been carefully selected by a reputable manager whose sole interest lay in optimizing the performance of the CDO. They no more thought they were trading “against” short investors than investors in IBM or Treasury bonds do. In violation of these reasonable expectations, Goldman arranged that a party whose interests were diametrically opposed to those of investors would have significant influence over the selection of the portfolio. Goldman misrepresented that party’s role to the manager and failed to disclose the conflict of interest to investors. That’s inexcusable. Was it illegal? I don’t know, and I don’t care.

In a separate post, Steve mulls a more abstract view of whether Goldman did indeed act as a ’secret agent’ for one client to the disadvantage of another.

And was that pragmatic, let alone legal?After reading the filing, Bond Girl is cutting:

Seriously, why the hell would anyone want to be a client of Goldman Sachs after reading this?

Why would you work with a firm where employees mock the transactions they are arranging for you to purchase in emails?

Why would you work with a firm that would let someone that it knows is going to have a short position in the investment – because it helped them attain it – help structure that investment for you?

Why would you work with a firm that sees your multi-million-dollar business relationship as nothing more than collateral damage in its ultimate pursuit of fees?

This is not what investment bankers do. This is what backstabbing sociopaths do.

_____________________________

ACA and due diligence

Meanwhile, Henry Blodget and Felix Salmon squared off over whether Paulson’s prior involvement did indeed materially affect ACA’s position — or whether a ’sophisticated investor’ should have known better. Quite the ding-dong, this.

Blodget argues that there is a difference between control and influence:

Paulson did NOT have control over which securities were selected for the CDO.

This is critical. It’s also a fact that is clearly visible in the evidence the SEC provided.

The firm that DID have control over which securities were selected, ACA, was a highly sophisticated firm that analyzed securities like this for a living. It had FULL CONTROL over which securities were included in the CDO. We know this because, of the 123 bonds that Paulson proposed for the CDO, ACA only included 55 of them. In other words, ACA dinged more than half of the bonds Paulson wanted in the CDO, presumably because they did not meet ACA’s quality hurdle.

Now, did Paulson influence which securities ACA selected? Yes, he probably did. But any time someone says or does anything with respect to a security, there are lots of things that influence decisions.

Salmon calls this argument ‘pathetically unconvincing’:

Let’s remember here that in the end there were 90 securities in the CDO. Of those 90, it seems that 55 were chosen by Paulson. In other words, more than 60% of the securities in the CDO were picked, essentially, out of a stacked deck. It didn’t matter which securities ACA chose; Paulson had come up with his longlist of 123 securities precisely because all of them were particularly toxic. That’s a material fact which, if ACA had known it, would surely have sufficed to get them to exit the deal entirely.

Paul Kedrosky has the original flipbook for the ill-starred CDO, for reference.

Pivoting from that flipbook, Erik Gerding of The Conglomerate zeroes in on the SEC’s case over disclosure:

My guess is that a reasonable investor would indeed want to know that Paulson was involved in selecting the deck. What’s the support for this beyond the SEC’s Complaint? Look at the “flipbook” for the transaction provided to investors by Goldman…

It goes on at length of why ACA is a good collateral manager for the CDO. On p. 27, it includes a bullet point “Alignment of Economic Interest.” The SEC complaint zooms in on this little nugget (see Complaint Para. 38). (Note to law students: bullet points in “powerpoint” style are not only bad devices to communicate ideas, they have some itty bitty securities law problems when used to market securities. If you can’t formulate something in a complete sentence, try again.) Nowhere does the flipbook mention that the Paulson hedge fund was involved in selecting the collateral for the CDO.

But it’s far from a slam dunk, he notes. Still, Salmon has raised a wider set of questions about the Abacus deal — so this aspect will no doubt run and run as a point of bloggy contention.


(from FT, Apr 19 2010)

[Abacus] The experience of Laura Schwartz

by Tracy Alloway

Laura Schwartz is a name that appears in Goldman Sachs’ defence documents — the bank’s counter-arguments against the SEC’s allegations of civil fraud in its Abacus CDO — and the pitch-book for the deal.

From 2004 to 2007 she was head of ACA Capital’s CDO Asset Management business, earning a salary of $275,000 in 2006, according to Bloomberg data. ACA was at the time a monoline insurer and CDO manager — running some 26 deals, worth $17.5bn, by May 2007.

In early 2007 Schwartz began working with Goldman Sachs on the Abacus 2007-AC1 deal, a $2bn synthetic CDO, referencing subprime mortgages. ACA’s role was to act as selection agent for the portfolio of securities the CDO would reference, but it was also an investor in the deal.

Part of the SEC complaint against Goldman alleges that one of the bank’s employees — Fabrice Tourre — misled investors into believing that hedge fund Paulson & Co was buying Abacus’ equity.

The equity tranche is the riskiest portion of a CDO, so being an investor in the tranche might suggest one had some confidence in the deal’s performance. The idea is that by believing that Paulson was going long Abacus, the CDO would be more marketable to the investors; ACA and German bank IKB.

The following is gleaned from Part I of Goldman’s defence documents:

* Laura Schwartz of ACA’s January 8, 2007 e-mail to Gail Kreitman in which she wrote “I have no idea how [the Paulson meeting] went – I wouldn’t say it went poorly, not at all, but I think it didn’t help that we didn’t know exactly how they want to participate in the space. Can you give us some feedback?” (GS MBS-E-003499710);

* Fabrice Tourre’s January 10, 2007 e-mail to Ms. Schwartz containing the “Transaction Summary” in which he stated that the transaction was “sponsored by Paulson” and included the line: “[0] – [9]%: pre-committed first loss,” (GS MBS E-003504901) which the Staff stated described the equity tranche; and

* Ms. Kreitman’s e-mail exchanges with Ms. Schwartz on January 14 and 28, 2007 in which Ms. Kreitman did not correct Ms. Schwartz’s apparent misunderstanding that Paulson was an equity investor (GS MBS-E-007980762; GS MBS-E-007992234).8

Goldman’s defence centres around a few things. For a start, the banks says that, under confidentiality requirements, it could not have disclosed Paulson’s role in the deal even if it wanted to. Furthermore, the bank never intended for ACA to infer that Paulson was investing in the equity tranche.

When it comes to those e-mails, the bank says that it doesn’t know what Tourre meant by “[0] – [9]%: pre-committed first loss,” and “sponsor” doesn’t necessarily mean equity investor. Meanwhile, Kreitman’s communiques were largely irrelevant, Goldman says, as she was simply the bank’s relationship manager for ACA, and did not participate directly in the creation of Abacus.

One of the over-arching themes of Goldman’s defence, however, is that it was not actually materially important for ACA to know that Paulson was or was not the equity investor. Thus it was under no obligation to disclose the position.

And here’s where things get really interesting.

From the defence document:

Similarly, the fact that ACA may have perceived Paulson to be an equity investor is of no moment. As a threshold matter, the interests of an equity investor would not necessarily be aligned with those of ACA or other noteholders, and holders of equity may also hold other long or short positions that offset or exceed their equity exposure. Indeed, Laura Schwartz of ACA understood this from her work on a transaction that closed in December 2006 in which Magnetar, a hedge fund that bought equity and took short positions in mezzanine-level debt, participated. (See GS MBS-E-007992234 (“Magnetar-like equity investor”).) Certainly, ACA could have questioned Paulson about its interests if it that information were significant to it.

Chicago-based hedge fund Magnetar is another name that has been hurled into prominence in recent months.

ProPublica ran a very detailed series about how the hedge fund created subprime CDOs to short in the years before the financial crisis. The Magnetar Trade, according to ProPublica, involved investing in the equity tranche, and then shorting its own position.

ProPublica also said some people have alleged that the hedge fund also helped stuff the CDOs with riskier mortgages — an allegation Magnetar strenuously denies. The hedge fund says it was arbitraging between the different layers of securities and was “net long”, rather than engineering a short.

Magnetar closed at least 26 subprime deals in 2006 and 2007, according to ProPublica.

Schwartz’s work was on ACA Aquarius 2006-1, a $2bn CDO which closed in September 2006.

Her name and biography appear in the prospectus for the deal, and ACA is listed as CDO manager — a similar role to the one it had on Goldman’s Abacus 2007 project.

Thus it looks like, in one sense, Schwartz’s experience on the construction of Abacus could well lie at the heart of a legal battle between Goldman and the SEC. Proving whether ACA was misled into believing Paulson was a long investor in the deal will no doubt involve her perspective.

In another sense, Schwartz’s overall experience as a CDO manager, including her role in Magnetar’s Aquarius CDO, could act as a litmus test for the sophistication of Abacus investors — something Goldman refers to in its defence documents over and over again:

Like other transactions of this type, all participants were highly sophisticated institutions that were knowledgeable about subprime securitization products and had both the resources and the expertise to perform due diligence, demand any information that was important to them, analyze the portfolio, form their own market views and negotiate forcefully at arm‟s length.

As for Schwartz, she appears to have left ACA in late 2007 — shortly before the firm divested itself of its CDO business.


(from FT, Apr 20 2010)

Profile: Fabrice Tourre, Goldman Sachs

David Teather

Goldman Sachs is standing by its man – so far. The investment bank has said an internal inquiry cleared Fabrice Tourre, the 31-year-old at the centre of fraud allegations, of any wrongdoing. He was apparently not at work today, at Goldman's Fleet Street offices, but the bank said it was a "personal decision", adding he has not been suspended.

But if he does return to work, Tourre will find it difficult to live down the moniker of "Fabulous Fab" after describing himself as such in an already infamous e-mail sent to a friend, in which he boasted with a flourish that he would be a "survivor … of all these complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all of the implication of those monstrosities (sic)!!!".

French-born Tourre has a mathematics degree from the Ecole Centrale in Paris, one of the top universities in France, and a master's in operations research from Stanford University.

He joined Goldman in New York in 2001 and quietly worked his way up through the firm, to become a vice-president on the structured product trading desk, where he helped create the Abacus 2007-AC1 CDO, packed with toxic sub-prime mortgages.

He moved to London in late 2008 where he is now an executive director, a title that belies his relatively junior position in the bank.

Little else is known about Tourre. One report described him as "a slight man with a flair for salesmanship". The Daily Mail suggested he lives in a £3,000-a-month apartment, claims to come from a prominent French family, earns £1.5m a year and is something of a party animal.

He did at least have a clear understanding of the perils of the housing boom. In his e-mail of January 2007, he warned the "whole building is about to collapse anytime now", just three months ahead of closing the Abacus deal that is now under the microscope. In fact the New York Times cited a former colleague who said Tourre was "way ahead" of his time and had been predicting a crash as early as 2005.

(from guardian.co.uk, April 19, 2010)

Leaked Goldman Presentation on Abacus Trade

Yves Smith, creator of Naked Capitalism: "We received a copy of the document via e-mail and assumed this is being leaked broadly (which begs the question of whether this was by happenstance or deliberate. The proximity to the filing of the suit suggests the latter). Richard Smith published it on ScribD:"

Abacus-2007-AC1-INDICATIVE TERMS

Yves Smith: "Several items jump out.

First is the unseemly number of pages devoted to touting ACA’s expertise and deliberate screening process, namely pages 20 to 48 and 57 through 63. ACA presumably provided all the material in this section, which is misleading, but since it was for the most part not incorporated in the offering documents, ACA would appear not to be liable (plus Goldman is still on the hook, since it was making representations re ACA’s process and procedures). The amount of information provided gives further support to the idea that the caliber and independence of the collateral manager was an important consideration for prospective investors in the deal.

Second is the long list of contacts on page 65, including Jonathan Egol (who spearheaded the Abacus program) and Testuya Ishikawa (who has left the industry and wrote the book How I Caused the Credit Crunch). As many have remarked, the singling out of Tourre seems odd.

Goldman released a short statement today on the pending suit and has provided a longer statement in its defense. Its basic arguments are:

1. Goldman lost money on the deal. Hhm, is that because the losses were larger than the guarantee provided by ACA on the super senior tranche? (The statement “ACA was the biggest investor” presumably translates into “ACA insured the super senior tranche” but to the extent the insurance failed, Goldman would be exposed). That would be a failure of risk management (as in GS expected the deal to fail, but its hedge was insufficient).

2. Goldman made adequate disclosure. We’ll see how that contention holds up as more information comes out."

(from Naked Capitalism, April 16, 2010)

Tuesday, February 16, 2010

Bruce Krasting is commenting on revaluation of Yuan

In my yearend projections for 2010 I said (among other things) the following:


-China will surprise us all and revalue the Yuan by 10%. The currency will still be undervalued.


On Monday morning Bloomberg has a story out quoting Goldman’s Chief European Economist as saying:

Feb. 15 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Chief Economist Jim O’Neill said China may be poised to let its currency strengthen as much as 5 percent to slow the world’s fastest growing major economy.

I doubt that Mr. O’Neill is making a guess here. I think he may have some real insight on this. When he says this, I listen:


“I have a strong opinion that they’re close to moving the exchange rate,”

Say this story is true and in the not too distant future China will adjust its currency against the dollar by a reasonably significant amount. Assume that they move by 5%. What might this mean in the scheme of things? What are the market implications, if any? Just some thoughts.

-If China does do something significant, it is another sign that should not be avoided. Something is up with China. They are changing direction. A currency move this week followed by the monetary moves last week is a clear indication that things have heated up, and they don’t like it. The two steps (assumes currency reval.) would prove that Chanos etal. were right all along. There is a bubble.

-If you were China Inc. and you owned the IOU’s behind a monster amount of empty buildings (and cities) the last thing you would do is to strengthen your currency and tighten monetary policy. But if the arguments in favor of reversing stimulus outweigh the consequences of extending fast money policies then it is not hard to predict that those empty buildings will remain so for a while to come. There would appear to be some urgency to the Chinese steps, should they occur.

-Should this happen it would come at a very inconvenient time. China’s currency is tied to the dollar. The dollar his risen against the Euro by 10% in the last two months. Therefore China’s currency has risen by the same amount against the Euro Zone. That is a big market for China’s exports. If they revalue against the dollar by 5% and the dollar stays where it is they will have taken a 15% hit on the terms of trade in just 60 days. If I were China I would be putting out the story, “Our currency is up 10% versus half the world. Stop yapping at us to make it higher still”. So that makes the timing of this (should GS be correct) very suspicious in my mind.

-All else being equal I would rate this a win-win for the Euro Zone and Brazil (again), a win-lose for the USA and a lose-lose for China. For the US it might be of some benefit to the big exporters, but I doubt it. Any improvement on pricing will be offset by a reduction in demand. For all of those Wal-Mart and Home Depot shoppers beware. Prices are going up.

The market outlook on this is murky for me. There are some checks and balances to this that could in theory bring some stability. Everyone has been leaning on the Chinese to hike their currency. So if they were to do it the spin would be, “Hey! Here’s some Good News!” I don’t see it that way.

-Last week the market tanked on the news that China was moving on reserves. This is no different. So if it was bad last week. It will be bad this week too.

-Should this happen it raises a big question about the HK dollar. Logically that would have to be re-pegged as well. Should that not take place I would expect a mega move into the HK$. I can’t imagine that the Central Bank will accommodate that.

The money flow to Hong Kong has been big and steady for some time. The reserves were $206B as of 12/31/2009. Should there be an adjustment in the HK$ rate there would be some very big overnight profits. At some point thereafter the reserve flow would reverse to more normal levels. Say 50% or $100b. That just means there is one less buyer of US Treasury bills at the next auction. Most of the hot money that went to HK was borrowed, so when the short-term flows are reversed the margin debt is paid down. There is no new or alternate buyer of those Tbills.

-China was supposed be a global engine for growth. Whatever your expectations were on that score a week ago you must revise them down today. A year ago there was all the talk of green shoots. There were many of them. China tightening its belt at this time and at this pace is a brown patch. In Europe there are dead tumbleweeds blowing around. These things do not make for an improving growth story.

-Using the wisdom of purchasing power parity an argument could be made that the Euro would be a tad undervalued should the Chinese move. I don’t see that happening either. Much to the chagrin of the Chinese the dollar could go right on rising. To hell with purchasing power parity.

-If you read the Chinese steps as deflationary, it has to be bearish for the commodities. They have all been backing up. This could cause that to continue.

-Gold could be interesting. Say the thoughts on the dollar were right and we move toward 1.30. Say the commodity markets followed that lead. That would imply that gold should move lower in sympathy. I would watch that one. These things that may be coming are on the side of the shelf that is marked: DESTABILIZING. I am not sure if this will come into the gold equation at this time. It will soon enough.

-In this environment the TLT is not the place to be. Not yet.

-On paper this could mean that China has less exports and more imports. Should that be the case their reserves will stop growing. Who is it that is going to be buying all of the paper that is being created by all of the debtors in 2010? At the moment I am having trouble of thinking of any ‘size’ buyers. Possibly Ben B will have to add some more demand to meet the supply. That would be very big tumbleweed.

The GS report got me to write these thoughts. This is all just blue-sky thinking. Probably nothing will come of it. I hope not.



(from Bruce Krasting's blog, February 25, 2010)

Thursday, February 11, 2010

Sergey Aleynikov was indicted

Sergey Aleynikov was indicted today on charges that he stole the secrets to the bank's closely guarded high-frequency trading platform.


The platform, according to the indictment, gave Goldman Sachs a "competitive advantage" by executing high volumes of trades at breakneck speeds. Aleynikov, who could face 25 years in jail, was in charge of a group of computer programmers who maintained the bank's trading platform. The platform reportedly generated "many millions" in profits each year.

According to the indictment, Aleynikov went to work for Teza, a newly-formed firm in Chicago, in April of 2009, and was tasked with developing a high-frequency trading platform for the company. With a pay package totaling $400,000 at Goldman Sachs, Aleynikov was certainly already well-compensated. Teza, however, offered him a guaranteed salary of $300,000, a guaranteed bonus of $700,000 and a profit-sharing agreement that was worth about $150,000.

Prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's office in Manhattan allege that Aleynikov, after 5 p.m. on his last day at Goldman Sachs, "executed the transfer of thousands of lines of source code for Goldman's high-frequency trading system." And, the indictment alleges, he skirted Goldman's security apparatus by uploading the source code files to a server in Germany.

Aleynikov then encrypted the files and, several days later, logged onto a computer from his home in New Jersey and downloaded Goldman's proprietary data. He then carried that data into a meeting with Teza workers, according to the indictment.

In November, the government indicated that it was discussing a plea deal with Aleynikov that might have resulted in little or no jail time, reported Reuters.

Zero Hedge wonders whether or not a trial will reveal some crucial details of Goldman Sachs's secret sauce:

"The indictment comes at a time when most observers had expected this case would be settled quietly, as the prevailing sense was the Goldman had no actionable case, especially after numerous months of court delays.

The question now is how much information will be made available for discovery, and how much will be filed under Seal so that no additional Goldman HFT secrets enter the public domain."


READ the indictment:




Aleynikov_ Sergey Indictment -
full screen

Friday, January 29, 2010

Goldman Sees Russia ‘Correction’ as Stock Funds Exit


Russian stocks risk a “temporary correction” as commodity prices fall on concern China will increase interest rates, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. said.

“We see this as no more than a temporary correction, yet we would recommend tactically to diversify with a more defensive exposure,” strategists led by Moscow-based Sergei Arsenyev wrote in a research report. Russia is unlikely to outperform in the “very short term,” he wrote.

Russia’s Micex Index has retreated 5.5 percent from its 2010 high on Jan. 19 as crude oil prices sank 6.4 percent. Investors are concerned that interest-rate increases by China will restrain a recovery in the world’s fastest-expanding major economy that helped spur a surge in global equities since March including in Russia, the world’s largest energy exporter.

Russian equity funds posted their first net outflows in 12 weeks as investors withdrew $608.5 million from emerging markets on concern the global recovery will slow, research company EPFR Global said. Net outflows from Russia were $87 million for the week ended Jan. 27.

“We believe the outflow of cash from Russian assets might lead to additional pressure on the market and exacerbate the downward correction,” Mark Robinson, head of equity research at UniCredit SpA in London, said in a report dated today.

The Micex advanced 0.2 percent, reversing an earlier decline, to 1,408.10 at 4:39 p.m. in Moscow. The Micex level is equivalent to 8.7 times analysts’ 2010 earnings estimates for its traded companies, the lowest among major equity markets in developing countries, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

‘Cheap’ Valuations

Russia is still the most attractive emerging market in the “medium term” given “cheap” valuations and the potential for the central bank to lower borrowing costs over the next 12 months, Goldman’s Arsenyev wrote.

OAO Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, was added to Goldman’s “focus sell” list for central and east Europe, the Middle East and Africa, according to the report dated yesterday, which cited the potential elimination of tax breaks in eastern Siberia. Rosneft shares fell as much as 1.9 percent and last traded 0.9 percent lower.

Telkom South Africa Ltd. was included in the “focus buy” list to boost holdings of so-called defensive companies with less reliance on economic growth.

“We are concerned about short-term headwinds for emerging markets,” Arsenyev wrote. “Our key concern is potential China tightening and its negative impact on short-term commodities prices.”


(Bloomberg, January 29, 2010)

Tuesday, October 13, 2009

Meredith Whitney Goldman downgrade

This is how analyst Meredith Whitney treats the media — the industry that helped turn her into the renowned bankslayer she is today:

Meredith Whitney GS downgrade

While clients get the full Goldman note, journalists are left to psychically read Whitney’s thoughts. Huff.

Other media outlets, we should note, are just as clueless as we are. Here’s Bloomberg for instance:

Oct. 13 (Bloomberg) — Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the biggest U.S. securities firm before converting to a bank last year, was cut to “neutral” by Meredith Whitney, as the analyst dropped her only “buy” recommendation.

Whitney, who correctly predicted in 2007 that Citigroup Inc. would cut its dividend, didn’t update her price estimate on the shares in a summary note distributed to investors today. Further details on the downgrade weren’t immediately available.

While we have no idea about Whitney’s reasoning, we can note that her last action on Goldman was an upgrade (also expurgated for the media) from `neutral’ to `buy’ right before the bank released its record second-quarter results. That upgrade, incidentally, sent GS shares — and the whole of the US equity market — rallying.

Goldman Sachs is scheduled to report third-quarter earnings on Thursday.

(from FT.com, October 13, 2009)

Saturday, October 10, 2009

Who Will Profit from Cap-and-Trade?

Gone are Hank Paulson and Neel Kashkari; in their place are Treasury chief of staff Mark Patterson and CFTC chief Gary Gensler, both former Goldmanites. (Gensler was the firm's cohead of finance.) And instead of credit derivatives or oil futures or mortgage-backed CDOs, the new game in town, the next bubble, is in carbon credits — a booming trillion dollar market that barely even exists yet, but will if the Democratic Party that it gave $4,452,585 to in the last election manages to push into existence a groundbreaking new commodities bubble, disguised as an "environmental plan," called cap-and-trade.

The new carboncredit market is a virtual repeat of the commodities-market casino that's been kind to Goldman, except it has one delicious new wrinkle: If the plan goes forward as expected, the rise in prices will be government-mandated. Goldman won't even have to rig the game. It will be rigged in advance.

Here's how it works: If the bill passes, there will be limits for coal plants, utilities, natural-gas distributors and numerous other industries on the amount of carbon emissions (a.k.a. greenhouse gases) they can produce per year. If the companies go over their allotment, they will be able to buy "allocations" or credits from other companies that have managed to produce fewer emissions. President Obama conservatively estimates that about $646 billion worth of carbon credits will be auctioned in the first seven years; one of his top economic aides speculates that the real number might be twice or even three times that amount.

The feature of this plan that has special appeal to speculators is that the "cap" on carbon will be continually lowered by the government, which means that carbon credits will become more and more scarce with each passing year. Which means that this is a brand new commodities market where the main commodity to be traded is guaranteed to rise in price over time. The volume of this new market will be upwards of a trillion dollars annually; for comparison's sake, the annual combined revenues of all electricity suppliers in the U.S. total $320 billion.

Goldman wants this bill. The plan is (1) to get in on the ground floor of paradigmshifting legislation, (2) make sure that they're the profitmaking slice of that paradigm and (3) make sure the slice is a big slice. Goldman started pushing hard for capandtrade long ago, but things really ramped up last year when the firm spent $3.5 million to lobby climate issues. (One of their lobbyists at the time was none other than Patterson, now Treasury chief of staff.) Back in 2005, when Hank Paulson was chief of Goldman, he personally helped author the bank's environmental policy, a document that contains some surprising elements for a firm that in all other areas has been consistently opposed to any sort of government regulation. Paulson's report argued that "voluntary action alone cannot solve the climatechange problem." A few years later, the bank's carbon chief, Ken Newcombe, insisted that capandtrade alone won't be enough to fix the climate problem and called for further public investments in research and development. Which is convenient, considering that Goldman made early investments in wind power (it bought a subsidiary called Horizon Wind Energy), renewable diesel (it is an investor in a firm called Changing World Technologies) and solar power (it partnered with BP Solar), exactly the kind of deals that will prosper if the government forces energy producers to use cleaner energy. As Paulson said at the time, "We're not making those investments to lose money."

The bank owns a 10 percent stake in the Chicago Climate Exchange, where the carbon credits will be traded. Moreover, Goldman owns a minority stake in Blue Source LLC, a Utahbased firm that sells carbon credits of the type that will be in great demand if the bill passes. Nobel Prize winner Al Gore, who is intimately involved with the planning of cap-and-trade, started up a company called Generation Investment Management with three former bigwigs from Goldman Sachs Asset Management, David Blood, Mark Ferguson and Peter Harris. Their business? Investing in carbon offsets. There's also a $500 million Green Growth Fund set up by a Goldmanite to invest in greentech … the list goes on and on. Goldman is ahead of the headlines again, just waiting for someone to make it rain in the right spot. Will this market be bigger than the energyfutures market?

"Oh, it'll dwarf it," says a former staffer on the House energy committee.

Well, you might say, who cares? If cap-and-trade succeeds, won't we all be saved from the catastrophe of global warming? Maybe — but capandtrade, as envisioned by Goldman, is really just a carbon tax structured so that private interests collect the revenues. Instead of simply imposing a fixed government levy on carbon pollution and forcing unclean energy producers to pay for the mess they make, cap-and-trade will allow a small tribe of greedy-as-hell Wall Street swine to turn yet another commodities market into a private taxcollection scheme. This is worse than the bailout: It allows the bank to seize taxpayer money before it's even collected.

"If it's going to be a tax, I would prefer that Washington set the tax and collect it," says Michael Masters, the hedgefund director who spoke out against oilfutures speculation. "But we're saying that Wall Street can set the tax, and Wall Street can collect the tax. That's the last thing in the world I want. It's just asinine."

from RagingBull.com, October 8, 2009

Sunday, September 6, 2009

THE 8 REASONS GOLDMAN SACHS SAYS BUY THE CHINESE SELL-OFF

We see a mismatch between the recent 20% share price pullback and still robust underlying real demand. We see 8 stock-picking themes emerging:

(1) Our channel checks with a low-voltage copper transformer producer indicate demand is rising, with August shipments back to 2008 peaks.

(2) Along the value chain, we do not think the market has priced in the better-than-expected speed of economic recovery, positive for upstream commodities like coal; traders indicate positive surprise on coal demand.

 THE 8 REASONS GOLDMAN SACHS SAYS BUY THE CHINESE SELL OFF

(3) The magnitude of demand recovery may potentially lead to tightness in commodities (such as steel) long perceived as oversupplied; this offers potential upside in undervalued stocks. Steel traders see robust demand.

 THE 8 REASONS GOLDMAN SACHS SAYS BUY THE CHINESE SELL OFF

(4) Economic recovery in OECD countries (which account for about 40% of global consumption) could provide an additional boost to commodity prices, which are already buoyed by strong demand from China.

(5) China’s increasing percentage of global consumption structurally boosts the sustainability of this upcycle, reducing potential OECD “double dip” risk. Our new analysis shows a 10% increase in Chinese demand now offsets OECD weakness 2-3 times as much as it did in 2002 when China first joined the WTO.

(6) Sustainability of supply-side tightness to cushion rising raw material costs; we see copper/steel/coal as favorably positioned.

(7) Consolidation leaders such as Shenhua/Angang/Baosteel could see leverage increase for the upcycle via parent asset injection, in our view.

(8) Valuations are still around/below mid-cycle, such as steel/coal names.

Source: Goldman Sachs

Monday, May 11, 2009

Munger: the financial companies spent $500 million on political contributions and lobbying efforts over the last decade

Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Vice Chairman Charles Munger, whose company is the largest private shareholder in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Wells Fargo & Co., said banks will use their “enormous political power” to prevent changes to the industry that would benefit society.

“This is an enormously influential group of people, and 90 percent of that influence is being spent to gain powers and practices that the world would be better off without,” Munger, 85, said yesterday in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “It will be very hard to accomplish the kind of surgery that would be desirable for the wider civilization.”

Munger said policy makers should seek to impose limits on banks that are deemed “too big to fail” after financial institutions worldwide suffered more than $1 trillion in losses. The U.S. government and the Federal Reserve have spent, lent or committed $12.8 trillion, an amount that approaches the value of everything produced in the country last year, to stem the recession.

“We need to remove from the investment banking and the commercial banking industries a lot of the practices and prerogatives that they have so lovingly possessed,” Munger said. “If they are too big to fail, they are too big to be allowed to be as gamey and venal as they’ve been -- and as stupid as they’ve been.”

Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway, run by Munger’s long-time business partner Warren Buffett, nevertheless is a large investor in some of the biggest U.S. banks.

Berkshire paid $5 billion in September for preferred stock and warrants in New York-based Goldman Sachs, which was the world’s most profitable and highest paying securities firm before converting to a bank holding company. Goldman is now the fifth-biggest U.S. bank by assets.

Berkshire’s second-largest holding by market value after Coca-Cola Co. is Wells Fargo, the sixth-biggest U.S. bank. Berkshire also owns stakes in Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. bank by assets, as well as U.S. Bancorp, M&T Bank Corp. and SunTrust Banks Inc.

Munger said the financial companies spent $500 million on political contributions and lobbying efforts over the last decade. They have a “vested interest” in protecting the system as it exists because of the high levels of pay they were earning, he said. The five biggest U.S. securities firms, only two of which still exist as independent companies, paid their employees about $39 billion in bonuses in 2007.

“They would like to get back as closely as possible to business as usual, and they have enormous political power,” he said.


(from Bloomberg, May 2, 2009)

Friday, May 1, 2009

The Revolving Door Between Government and Wall Street

Glenn Greenwald, previously a constitutional law and civil rights litigator in New York, wrote on salon.com:

The ownership of the federal government by banks and other large corporations is effectuated in literally countless ways, none more effective than the endless and increasingly sleazy overlap between government and corporate officials. Here is just one random item this week announcing a couple of standard personnel moves:

Former Barney Frank staffer now top Goldman Sachs lobbyist

Goldman Sachs' new top lobbyist was recently the top staffer to Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., on the House Financial Services Committee chaired by Frank. Michael Paese, a registered lobbyist for the Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association since he left Frank's committee in September, will join Goldman as director of government affairs, a role held last year by former Tom Daschle intimate, Mark Patterson, now the chief of staff at the Treasury Department. This is not Paese's first swing through the Wall Street-Congress revolving door: he previously worked at JP Morgan and Mercantile Bankshares, and in between served as senior minority counsel at the Financial Services Committee.

So: Paese went from Chairman Frank's office to be the top lobbyist at Goldman, and shortly before that, Goldman dispatched Paese's predecessor, close Tom Daschle associate Mark Patterson, to be Chief of Staff to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, himself a protege of former Goldman CEO Robert Rubin and a virtually wholly owned subsidiary of the banking industry. That's all part of what Desmond Lachman -- American Enterprise Institute fellow, former chief emerging market strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and top IMF official (no socialist he) -- recently described as "Goldman Sachs's seeming lock on high-level U.S. Treasury jobs."

Read full article on salon.com "Top Senate Democrat: bankers "own" the U.S. Congress"

Friday, April 24, 2009

Kapitall Blog Defends Goldman Sachs Against Conspiracy Theory

People keep sending me articles about some Goldman Sachs proprietary trading conspiracy that is responsible for recent market advances. (Most notably, Zero Hedge.com and the seriously angry goldmansach666.com. Specifically, they blame program trading and quantitative trading.

I was the head of program trading at Morgan Stanley from 1996 to 2002 (both Global and U.S.), which, at the time, was the NYSE volume leader. And while I always enjoy a good conspiracy, in this case I find little evidence of one. As the managing director in charge of a trading desk and an ex-rival of Goldman Sachs I'd love to trash them, but I cannot. I find myself defending them.

First, the numbers in the ZeroHedge article shows an increase in program trading volume and Goldman Sachs' position at the top of the list as an indication of market manipulation pushing the market up. Program trading volume on a proprietary basis can come from many things, but all of which make pushing the entire market higher difficult to nearly impossible.

1. Quantitative (black box) trading:

Basically, most black box strategies involve something called mean reversion. This means when a stock moves too much relative to the stocks to which it is normally correlated the strategy buys the stocks that have have moved higher the least (or lower the most) and does the opposite with everything else. Actually, it is way more complicated than this and requires loads of academic explanations and complex statistical mathematics. But I hope you get the idea. Days of great volatility and fast market moves (like last week) provide lots of market dislocations (black box trading volume). Almost no black box strategy creates net buys or sells (every stock bought is offset by another that is sold.)

2. Index Arbitrage:

Index arbitrage is the risk neutral trading of index futures (like the S&P500) and stocks. In the case of last week, selling overpriced futures and buying stocks. While the program trading reports show Goldman reporting zero in this category, the complex NYSE rules on the subject of what kind of trading fall into which category leave the reporting firm lots of leeway on interpretation. Thus, much of what could be reported as index arbitrage by one firm is reported as principal trading by another.

3. Customer Facilitation:

The vast majority of customer facilitation occurs after the close and in the form of something called an EFP (Exchange for physical) in which a basket of stocks is exchange for an equal value of futures. Customers are typically pension funds, foreign government investment funds, index funds and other mutual funds. These can run in the billions of dollars at times - but with both sides relatively hedged. The unwind of these transactions by the facilitator is slow, lasting several days as the investment bank liquidates stock and futures positions. This dual liquidation doubles the initial EFP. Technically, these are proprietary trades not reported as customer facilitation but as principal.

4. ETF Creation:

In the normal course of providing liquidity to Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) investors, a market maker must trade a basket of the underlying stocks in order to create and sell and ETF. These transactions are generated electronically and very quickly in order to keep the ETF market efficient. Buyers of ETFs (as I expect last week) creates buyers of baskets of stock.

Now imagine all of these activities, mostly quantitative trading and index arbitrage, being done by several different departments at the same time (but in different ways) in a volatile and fast moving market. None of these activities create a net bias by Goldman Sachs to either be net long (buyer) or net short.

The only thing that can drive a market higher is buyers willing to pay more than current market prices. Buyers can include pension funds, corporations, mutual fund investors, speculators like hedge funds and individuals. These buyers use many instruments other that direct buying and all of them eventually find their way into stock prices. Futures, options and ETFs most notable among them.

Among the many financial market abuses that have occurred in the past few years, portfolio (program) trading is not among them.

(Excerpt from David Neubert's post in Kapitall Blog, April 13, 2009)

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

The Man Who Made Too Much

by Gary Weiss in Portfolio.com February 2009 Issue

Hedge fund manager John Paulson has profited more than anyone else from the financial crisis. His $3.7 billion payday in 2007 broke every record, and he made it all by betting against homeowners, shareholders, and the rest of us. Now he’s paying the price.

Two young men, traders on John ­Paulson’s staff, come into his hedge fund’s office seeking advice on whether to buy a certain debt security. Sitting just a few feet away, I have no idea what Paulson tells them. His slightly high-pitched voice is so soft that on the rare occasions he is forced to speak in public, he’s easily drowned out by the rustling of papers or the clearing of throats. When he appeared before a U.S. House committee in November to try to explain how he had lavishly profited while countless others had suffered, Paulson spoke so gently, even when inches from the microphone, that representatives repeatedly, and with growing irritation, had to ask him to speak up.

Paulson is smart enough to know that at this particular moment in history, the less he’s heard from, the better. The simple reason: He is not suffering. In an era in which losers are universal and making a profit seems somehow shady, Paulson is the most conspicuous of Wall Street’s winners. Paulson & Co.’s funds (with an estimated $36 billion under management and growing by the day) were up a staggering $15 billion as the markets teetered in 2007; one fund gained 590 percent, another 353 percent. All this reportedly garnered him a personal payday of $3.7 billion, among the biggest in history. In 2008, his funds didn’t climb nearly as much but were still successful enough to put him at the very top of his profession. By scoring returns of this magnitude, Paulson has dwarfed the success of George Soros, whose currency trades in the 1990s made him so much money that he has spent much of the rest of his career atoning for them.

Paulson makes no apologies. During our conversation in his conference room, he describes in detail how he pulled off the greatest financial coup in recent history—a two-year bet that the calamity we are now experiencing would take place. It was a megatrade involving dozens of financial instruments, along with prescient wagers that banks like Lehman Brothers would eventually go under. (View a graphic showing how much John Paulson has outperformed other indices.)

Left unexamined is the uncomfortable moral dimension of Paulson’s achievement. If he saw all of this coming, was it right for him to keep his own counsel, quietly trading while the financial system melted down? Do traders who figure out a way to profit from our misery deserve our contempt or our admiration, however grudging?

The question has long dogged that most hated species of Wall Street trader, the short-seller who profits by trading borrowed stock. Because of his recent success, Paulson is now their designated king. So it’s no surprise that he is finding himself the object of finger-pointing about who caused the mess we’re in.

On November 13, Paulson and four other titans of the hedge fund world—Soros, Philip Falcone of Harbinger Capital Partners, Ken Griffin of Citadel Investment Group, and James Simons of Renaissance Technologies—were forced to answer questions in the glare of TV lights before the House Oversight Committee, chaired by Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California, the same man who dog-and-ponied tobacco executives into claiming under oath that cigarettes aren’t addictive. The five were selected because they were the highest-paid fund managers in 2007, as ranked by Alpha magazine, an industry trade publication.

There has never really been a time when short-sellers have been feted. They had a brief moment in the sun following the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, when hedge fund manager Jim Chanos, among others, was credited with uncovering Enron’s fraud. Even though short-sellers red-flagged the dangers of subprime lending years before the crisis—Gradient Analytics, a research firm, issued private warnings as far back as 2002—they have received few brownie points since the housing bust began. “Everybody’s too busy looking out for themselves to come to the defense of people who are perceived as profiting from the misery of others,” Chanos says.

In the view of many C.E.O.’s, short-sellers do more than just profit from corporate misfortune; they inflame it. C.E.O. Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers and Alan Schwartz, former C.E.O. of Bear Stearns, in their own recent appearances before congressional panels, blamed rumormongers and short-­sellers for the demise of their firms.

“The shorts and rumormongers succeeded in bringing down Bear Stearns,” Fuld ­asserted. “And I believe that unsubstantiated rumors in the marketplace caused significant harm to Lehman Brothers.” Schwartz gave similar testimony when he appeared before the Senate Banking Committee in April, saying that there was a run on the bank despite a “capital cushion well above what was required to meet regulatory standards.” He testified that “market forces continued to drive and accelerate our precipitous liquidity decline.” Banking Committee chairman Christopher Dodd chimed in that “this goes beyond rumors. This is about collusion.”

But was it? Chanos, for one, is tired of the blame-the-shorts litany, and he recalls a conversation with Bear Stearns’ Schwartz to make his point.

The day before the Fed’s rescue of Bear Stearns, Chanos says he was walking to the Post House restaurant in New York City, when, at 6:15 p.m., his cell phone rang. He saw the Bear Stearns exchange come up on his caller I.D. and took the call.

“Jim, hi, it’s Alan Schwartz.”

“Hi, Alan.”

“Well, Jim, we really appreciate your business and your staying with us. I’d like you to think about going on CNBC tomorrow morning, on Squawk Box, and telling everybody you still are a client, you have money on deposit, and everything’s fine.”

“Alan, how do I know everything’s fine? Is everything fine?”

“Jim, we’re going to report record earnings on Monday morning.” 

“Alan, you just made me an insider. I didn’t ask for that information, and I don’t think that’s going to be relevant anyway. Based on what I understand, people are reducing their margin balances with you, and that’s resulting in a funding squeeze.”

“Well, yes, to some extent, but we should be fine.”

“This is now 6:15 on Thursday night, the night before the collapse,” Chanos says. “It was after a meeting with Molinaro”—Bear Stearns C.F.O. Sam Molinaro—“who basically told him at that meeting, ‘We’re done. We’re gone. We need money overnight we don’t have.’  So here he is, calling one of his biggest clients to go on CNBC the next morning to say everything’s fine when clearly it’s not. And he knew it wasn’t.”

Chanos refused to go on CNBC. By 6:30 the next morning, word was out that the Fed was engineering the rescue of Bear Stearns. Chanos realized that he could have been on CNBC while that was ­announced. “I thought, That fucker was going to throw me under the bus no matter what.”

“So here it is,” Chanos says. “Alan Schwartz takes the position ‘Short-sellers were our problem,’ and who did he try to get to vouch for him on the morning of the collapse? The largest short-seller in the world. You want to talk about ethics and who’s telling the truth on these things? It’s unbelievable.”

Schwartz, not surprisingly, has a different version of events. “I did not make the statements attributed to me by Mr. Chanos,” he says through a spokesperson. According to someone who has spoken to Schwartz, the ex-C.E.O.’s side of the story is that the conversation took place on Wednesday, not Thursday, and that it was entirely different from what was related by Chanos. His contentions are that the call was an effort to obtain a public statement from Chanos that “a group of short-sellers out there are trying to take Bear Stearns down” and that no information on Bear’s financial strength was conveyed to Chanos.

Paulson is in his mid-fifties, hair thinning at the top just a bit, with a slight paunch that he fights by jogging in Central Park, a half-block from the 28,000-square-foot Upper East Side townhouse that he bought a few years ago. He is of medium height, medium build, medium disposition. He favors old-fashioned tortoiseshell bifocals and dark-gray suits—none of the forced informality that you find in some hedge fund offices. He speaks fluidly and candidly and is unmoved by critics of his chosen profession. This, after all, is a man whose mind has been set on making vast, historic amounts of money since he was a kid, when he bought candy in bulk and sold individual pieces to his buddies at a profit.

At the beginning of 2008, he says, the general thinking was, No, we’re not going to have a recession; we’re going to have a slowdown. “Then there would be a pickup in the second half of the year. When the second half started looking as bad as the first, the general feeling became, We’re not going to have a pickup; we’ll have a slowdown.”

Paulson is astounded that some optimists continue to expect that somehow the formerly unsinkable economy will remain afloat, at least long enough for the government’s rescue boats to arrive. “Now that we’re in a recession, they’re probably admitting, ‘Okay, we’re in a recession, but it will probably last just two to three quarters.’ So they’re always underestimating the severity of the magnitude,” he says.

Paulson’s own view of the current situation is much darker. He predicts that the recession will last well into 2010 and that unemployment will reach 9 percent, a sharp increase from its current perch just below 7 percent. “We have a long way to go before we reach the bottom,” he says.

Paulson has become a lightning rod not simply because he made money in an awful market, but because of the way he made it. He wagered against subprime securities while everyone else was piling in. He bet that in addition to Lehman Brothers, other banks like Washington Mutual and ­Wachovia were due for a fall.

Long before the financial crisis hit, Paulson, according to one person briefed on the trade, invested $22 million in a credit default swap that eventually paid $1 billion when the federal government opted not to rescue Lehman Brothers. That amounts to a staggering $45.45 for each dollar invested.

John Paulson was born in 1955 in Queens, New York, in a pleasant and somewhat obscure middle-class neighborhood called Beechhurst. His father, Alfred, an accountant who came from a Norwegian family that had settled in Ecuador, rose to become C.F.O. of Ruder & Finn, a public relations agency. But John’s investment-­banking genes seemed to have come from his mother’s father, Arthur Boklan, who, during the crash of 1929, was a banker at a long-since-vanished Wall Street firm. In an interesting parallel with his grandson, he apparently prospered even as the Great Depression dragged the country into misery. In 1930, according to census records, he was able to afford a $220-a-month apartment in the Turin, a stately building that still stands at 93rd Street and Central Park West in Manhattan.

Boklan saw to it that his grandson had an early appreciation for the principles of capitalism. When John was a small child, Boklan was the one who encouraged him to buy Charms candy in bulk at the supermarket and then sell the individual candies to kids in the schoolyard at a substantial markup. His profits grew, as did his appreciation for economies of scale and the tendency of certain commodities to become mispriced through ignorance or carelessness. It was also the point at which he would become transfixed by the process of turning pennies into dollars. Paulson would spend much of the rest of his career under the tutelage of older Wall Street role models, seeking to replicate those days with his grandfather.

Following high school in Brooklyn, Paulson moved on to New York University, which in the 1970s offered a popular seminar taught by John Whitehead, then a senior partner at Goldman Sachs. Paulson listened, fascinated, as Robert Rubin, later secretary of the Treasury under Bill Clinton and now an unofficial adviser to Barack Obama—talked about the mysterious and new (to Paulson, anyway) world of risk arbitrage. At the time, the scholarly, soft-spoken Rubin was viewed, at least by Paulson’s professor, as the smartest partner at Goldman Sachs; he was certainly the richest. Paulson graduated first in the class of 1978, with visions of arbitrage in his future.

Harvard Business School followed. There, Paulson came under the spell of another established star in finance, the leveraged-buyout titan Jerry Kohlberg. “I had never heard of Jerry Kohlberg,” Paulson recalls, “but one of my friends told me, ‘Forget about investment banking. You’ve got to hear Jerry Kohlberg. These guys make more money than anybody on Wall Street.’ ” According to Paulson, Kohlberg described how he engineered the L.B.O. of a company by putting up just $500,000 in equity and then obtaining a $20 million bank loan secured by the company’s assets. The company was turned around and sold at a profit of $17 million in two years’ time.

Paulson received his M.B.A. and then spent his time in pursuit of as much money as he could earn. In 1980, the hottest jobs were not in investment banking but in management consulting. So when Paulson finished at Harvard that year, he joined one of the leading lights in the field, the Boston Consulting Group. Though the starting salaries were far higher than those in investment banking, he realized that even the partners didn’t manage to pull in the kind of money he was hoping for. Thus, following a chance social encounter with Kohlberg, Paulson moved to Wall Street, where he was introduced to Leon Levy of Oppenheimer & Co. Paulson was soon hired by Levy’s new venture, Odyssey Partners.

After a couple of years at Odyssey, Paulson realized he was not getting the training he needed to climb the ­investment-banking money tree. So in 1984, just as the bull market was beginning, the 28-year-old joined Bear Stearns as an investment-banking associate. Four years later, he was promoted to managing director but soon opted to strike out on his own. After dabbling in real estate and beer—Paulson was an early investor in what would become the Boston Beer Co.—he joined the great, long march of former investment bankers and traders into the hedge fund business in 1994, going where he thought the money was.

Paulson began with about $2 million of his own money, just a blip in the hedge fund world, even then. The firm consisted of just Paulson and an assistant. He shared office space in a Park Avenue building with other small hedge funds.

At first, growth was slow. Paulson, who lived in an apartment in Lower Manhattan above what is now a discount shoe outlet, shepherded his money carefully and began to establish a track record. In keeping with the norms of the time, he charged a fee of 20 percent of profits and 1 percent of assets—a comfortable sum when the size of his fund was $20 million but nothing like what he has made recently.

Then, in the late 1990s, came the tech bubble, and more important for Paulson, who was shorting stocks and betting big on corporate mergers, its bursting in 2001. When the market crashed after stocks lost steam that year, Paulson’s funds climbed 5 percent and rose the same amount in 2002, demonstrating his uncanny ability to avoid losing his investors’ cash as the rest of the market cratered. (Indeed, Paulson has had only one down year out of the past 15: His funds recorded a 4.9 percent decline in 1998, the year of the debacle in the Asian markets.) Money continued to pour in. By 2003, his funds had $600 million under management; two years later, their value was upwards of $4 billion.

Paulson began branching out, moving away from betting on mergers and into the financial instruments of firms in bankruptcy. He was still as obscure as he could be, keeping his name and that of his wife, Jenny, out of the papers, though they did begin to accumulate the usual symbols of hedge fund wealth. He left his apartment on Broadway for the palatial quarters of a mansion on East 86th Street and bought an opulent, though not extravagant, house in the Hamptons, outside of New York City.

Paulson got wind of the coming storm in the credit markets through the infallible barometer of prices. By 2005, the amount of money he could make on the riskiest securities was not enough to justify the risk he was taking. Pricing, in his view, made no sense. Paulson concluded that he could do better on the short side—wagering that prices of risky securities would fall.

“We felt that housing was in a bubble; housing prices had appreciated too much and were likely to come down,” he says. “We couldn’t short a house, so we focused on mortgages.” He began taking short positions in securities that he believed would collapse along with the housing market.

The best opportunities were in the junkiest portion of the housing market: subprime. Pricing of subprime securities “was absurd,” Paulson says. “It didn’t make sense.” Subprime securities graded triple-B—in other words, those that the credit-rating agencies thought were just a tad better than junk—were trading for only one percentage point over risk-free Treasury bills. This absurdity appealed to Paulson as easy money.

While Paulson was hardly the only fund manager to bet against subprime, he seems to have made the most money, most consistently, from the banking industry’s troubles. One reason for this is that Paulson was able to recognize and act on the unimaginable—that the banks, which took on most of the subprime risk, had no clue what they were holding or how much it was worth. Big banks like Merrill Lynch, UBS, and Citigroup held triple-A-rated securities, but these were backed by collateral that was subprime at best, making the rating of the securities almost irrelevant. “They felt,” Paulson explains, “that by having 100 different tranches of triple-B bonds, they had diversification to minimize the risk of any particular bond. But all these bonds were homogeneous.” It was like having 100 different pieces of the same poisoned apple pie. “They all moved down together.”

What separated Paulson from the rest of the hedge fund crowd was his realization that nobody was able to value these complex securities. His advantage came when he was willing to admit that. Other traders refused to short the big banks because they couldn’t believe that such huge institutions would be so unaware of their own risks. Once that fact dawned on Paulson, he bet, fast and big, that the banks would fail. “We thought that many banks and brokerages were massively overleveraged, with very risky assets, and that a small decline in the assets would wipe out the equity and impair the debt,” Paulson says. He and his analysts knew that the banks were deep into subprime, and yet the prices of their debt securities hadn’t fallen, indicating that the rest of the market hadn’t caught on.

By the end of 2007, he started to beef up his short positions, focusing on overleveraged financial institutions—Wachovia and Washington Mutual among them.

And then there were derivatives. Since all that toxic waste on the balance sheet imperiled the survival of the banks, Paulson wanted to be sure he was prepared. So he bought credit default swaps, like the $22 million he bet against Lehman—essentially an insurance policy that paid off when Lehman’s bonds defaulted.

Even though Paulson didn’t actually own any Lehman bonds, he made more than $1 billion on that bet. It’s as though he’d bought insurance policies on houses he didn’t own along the Indian Ocean just moments before the tsunami hit.

Though the financial crisis has rewarded Paulson handsomely, he continues to search for investment opportunities. On October 2, he walked into a breakfast meeting at the J.P. Morgan Chase Tower, right across the street from his hedge fund’s old office on Park Avenue, to make a presentation to potential investors about a new fund he had started to trade distressed debt. Its name: the Paulson Recovery Fund. As usual, Paulson was calm and quiet. His associates described how Paulson & Co.’s funds had thrived during even the very worst declines in the market, with an annual growth rate of 17 percent since inception.

Slides in Paulson’s presentation declared that the U.S. had slipped into its deepest recession since World War II. His charts displayed the usual parade of bad tidings: a steep decline in home prices, soaring mortgage delinquencies, credit contracting, and hemorrhaging in the financial sector. The 14th chart showed his strategy. It read, “How do we benefit near-term?”

Paulson’s answer came in four bullet points: Cut leverage and build cash, eliminate exposure to the equity markets, maintain only short-term securities, and prepare for bargains in debt securities of distressed companies—a “$10 trillion opportunity,” another chart pointed out.

Paulson has also taken steps that may help him avoid being tagged as a robber baron, donating $15 million to the Center for Responsible Lending to support a program designed to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. His congressional testimony on November 13 included his thoughts on how the government could help the banks get back on their feet—something that will of course benefit everyone, not just the holders of those distressed securities that Paulson is eager to buy.

But it’s hard to see how any financier who made a fortune from market turbulence can improve his public image when the economy is in such serious trouble. George Soros, even with his massive philanthropic efforts to promote democracy in Eastern Europe, will probably go down in history as the man who broke the Bank of England. Traders like Paulson will probably never be popular. They might as well get used to it.

Paulson himself remains unrepentant. At a recent lunch for investors at the Metropolitan Club in Manhattan, his clients dined on Colorado rack of lamb and sipped champagne, the recession be damned.

Paulson, his wife, and their children still live in their home on East 86th Street, in a mansion that at one time was a men’s club.

They also have a seven-bedroom, seven-and-a-half-bath estate with an indoor pool on Ox Pasture Road in Southampton, New York; he bought the house in 2006 for $12.75 million. This past April, Paulson apparently wanted a place that was larger than a mere bungalow for his growing family, so he listed the property for $19.5 million.

At last look, it was still for sale; its asking price, which had been lowered at least twice, was down to $13.9 million. Evidently, John Paulson had bought at the top of the market.