Friday, May 15, 2009
Marc Faber: Long Agricultural Commodities
Faber points to a weak build in agricultural stocks (supplies) during the bumper harvest year of 2008. Low stocks, declining productivity, and increased demand persist from a long term perspective says Faber and will drive prices higher. Population growth is rising until 2030 and will have produced an additional billion mouths to feed between 2000 and 2012 alone.
Faber is well known for highlighting long term trends in asset prices through a careful read of history. He points to the Green Revolution between 1976 to 1986 as the era when growth in food production transitioned from increased land usage to higher yielding agricultural methods yet those benefits have run their course. Productivity fell by almost half between 1990 and 2007 and will continue that trend over the next decade.
Faber recommends only one-third allocation to commodity futures products due to the negative carry costs in those markets and also warns against farmland companies due to poor yields. One third of investor capital should go to listed agricultural companies and the other third to private companies. The long term opportunity is now.
(from Financial Post, May 12, 2009)
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Harvard Favors Korea and Brazil ETFs
Harvard University, the richest U.S. college, raised its holdings of exchange-traded funds that track stocks in Brazil, China and Mexico in the first quarter as emerging markets outperformed U.S. equities.
The biggest new purchase reported by Harvard Management Co., which oversees the school’s $28.8 billion endowment, was 1.74 million shares of iShares MSCI South Korea Index Fund valued at $49 million, according to a filing yesterday with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Its largest stake was 8.28 million shares of iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Index valued at $205 million.
The quarterly 13F filing, which doesn’t reflect all of Harvard’s equities, offers a glimpse of how the Cambridge, Massachusetts, school is navigating the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. The MSCI Emerging Market Index rose 0.52 percent in the quarter, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, a benchmark of U.S. stocks, fell 12 percent.
Harvard Management Co. reported buying 61 U.S. listed securities in the quarter and selling off 28, leaving 90 issues. The value of its holdings rose 35 percent to $771 million.
Harvard’s endowment fell 22 percent from July 1 through Oct. 31, and is headed for its worst performance in at least four decades. The fund has been run since July by Jane Mendillo, former chief investment officer of nearby Wellesley College.
The report doesn’t show the school’s investments in stocks outside of the U.S. or in hedge funds, private equity, commodities and real estate. In addition, more than half of the endowment is overseen by outside firms. John Longbrake, a Harvard spokesman, didn’t respond to an e-mail seeking comment.
Harvard added to its ETF holdings in the quarter by buying 2.27 million shares of Vanguard Emerging Markets, as well as 1.5 million shares of iShares MSCI Brazil Index Fund and 1.14 million iShares FTSE/Xinhua China 25 Index Fund.
Exchange-traded funds typically are designed to mimic the performance of market indexes. Unlike mutual funds, whose shares are priced once daily after the end of each trading session, ETFs are listed on an exchange where shares are bought and sold throughout the day like stocks.
Harvard’s new purchases during the quarter include 1.47 million Class A shares of News Corp., the media company run by Rupert Murdoch, and 1 million shares of wireless phone company Sprint Nextel Corp. The school sold all 722,000 shares of GenCorp Inc., a manufacturer of aerospace and defense products; 605,000 shares of Heckmann Corp., which sells bottled water in China; and 575,000 shares of Columbus Acquisition Corp., a company set up to make acquisitions.
Harvard, projecting an endowment loss of as much as 30 percent, has frozen hiring and salaries and fired staff. Harvard raised cash by issuing $2.5 billion in bonds in December after failing to sell $1.5 billion in private-equity stakes.
Harvard Management in February said it planned to fire as many as 50 workers, including investment professionals, as part of an effort by Mendillo to “rebalance and reengineer the organization,” Longbrake said at the time.
(from Bloomberg, May 14, 2009)
The epoch of the US housing bubble may be over, but “the pressure for repeated injections of cheap finance is not.”
Reflecting on Hyman Minsky moment and voices from the Summer of 2007 ...
Enter Hyman Minsky. The late US economist offered a theory of the behaviour of lenders, which many have re-examined in recent weeks.
He said credit conditions became increasingly lax in times of good economic health. Then the credit supply would dry up (through such measures as the tightening of lending standards). Then liquidity dries up as lenders call in loans and borrowers sold liquid assets to comply. The final "moment " came when central banks cut rates to avert economic collapse.
The theory was drawn to fit a world where, as in 1929, the decision whether to extend credit rested with bankers. Now, it rests with the markets. But its potential relevance to current circumstances is clear.
George Magnus of UBS suggests reasons to believe a Minsky Moment can be deferred. First, housing problems take a while to unfold. Second, companies have cleaned their balance sheets and are not heavily leveraged. Third, there is still much liquidity in the world system. High energy and commodity prices suggest petro-dollars will not go away.
Finally, there is still no clear evidence of economic weakness, as the most recent data underscore, or of a significant return by inflationary pressures.
All these factors could change quickly. But even with credit valuations back to earth, markets believe Minsky's Moment of reckoning can be deferred further.
Panic follows mania as night follows day, says the FT’s Martin Wolf, back from summer leave with fresh insights into the present market upheavals. “The great 19th-century economist and journalist, Walter Bagehot, knew this better than anybody. ‘Lombard Street’, his masterpiece, is dedicated to the phenomenon. It is devoted, too, to how central banks should deal with its results”, he says.
Ours has been a world of “confidence, cleverness and too much cheap credit”, says Wolf: “This is not new… The late Hyman Minsky, who taught at the University of California, Berkeley, laid down the canonical model. The process starts with ‘displacement’, some event that changes people’s perceptions of the future. Then come rising prices in the affected sector. The third stage is easy credit and its handmaiden, financial innovation.”
“The fourth stage is over-trading, when markets depend on a fresh supply of ‘greater fools’. The fifth stage is euphoria, when the ignorant hope to enjoy the wealth gained by those who came before them. The warnings of those who cry ‘bubble’ are ridiculed, because these Cassandras have been wrong for so long. In the sixth stage comes insider profit-taking. Finally, comes revulsion.”
In the latest cycle, notes Wolf, “displacement began with the huge cuts in interest rates in the early 2000s, which drove up prices in housing”. The easy credit was stimulated by innovations that allowed lenders to regard their service as somebody else’s problem. Then people started to buy dwellings to resell them. Subprime lending was a symptom of euphoria. “So, in a different way, was the rush of bankers into hedge funds” and of the big institutions into financing them. “Then came profit-taking, falling prices and, last week, true revulsion”.
This was what George Magnus of UBS bank calls a “Minsky moment” , notes Wolf: “The moment when credit dried up even to sound borrowers. Panic had arrived”.
The correct policy response is also well known, and was laid down by Bagehot himself, notes Wolf: “The central bank must save not specific institutions, but the market itself. It must advance money freely, at a penal rate, on good security.”
In providing money to the markets, the ECB, the Fed, the Bank of Japan and other central banks have been doing their jobs, says Wolf. But, “whether the terms on which they have done this were sufficiently penal is another matter”.
Financial markets, and particularly the big players within them, “need fear”, says Wolf. “Without it, they go crazy.” Moreover, he adds, “it is impossible for outsiders to regulate a global financial system riddled with conflicts of interest and dominated by huge derivatives markets, massive trading by highly leveraged hedge funds and reliance on abstruse mathematics and questionable statistical models. These markets must regulate themselves. The only thing likely to persuade them to do so is the certainty that the players will be allowed to go bust.”
The world has witnessed four great bubbles over the past two decades – in Japanese stocks in the late 1980s, in east Asia’s stocks and property in the mid-1990s, in the US (and European) stock markets in the late 1990s and, finally, in key housing markets in the 2000s, notes Wolf. “There has been too much imprudent finance worldwide, with central bankers and ministries of finance providing rescue at virtually every stage.”
Unfortunately, there is every chance of repeating mistakes, he warns. “A bail-out has already occurred in Germany, far from the epicentre. More are likely. US legislators want Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to bail out the mortgage markets.”
The pressure on the Fed to cut interest rates will also grow, Wolf predicts. And, as Larry Hathaway and Mr Magnus of UBS note, this looks a much more significant event than the LTCM implosion in 1998, he adds. The consequences cannot be “ring-fenced”, as were those of LTCM. “Trust in counterparties and financial instruments has fled. The likelihood is a period of recognising losses, tightening credit conditions and deleveraging.”
Such a period, “desirable in itself”, will lead to strong pressure for swift declines in interest rates, at least in the US, and so for another partial bail-out of a crisis-prone system, predicts Wolf. But such pressure “should be resisted as long as possible.”
Yet, he concludes, “the underlying challenge confronting the world’s central banks remains”: huge surplus savings in key parts of the world; corporate sectors that do not need to borrow and so limited categories of creditworthy and willing borrowers, households in rich countries foremost among them. The epoch of the US housing bubble may be over, but “the pressure for repeated injections of cheap finance is not.”
(from FT.com, August 15, 2007)
Mr. Issa nailed the truth on the FED's settlement of AIG CDS
In a hearing not covered by the so-called "mainstream media" but covered on Cspan, Liddy, AIG's CEO, in response to a question by Rep Kaptur said:
"When The Fed set up Maiden Lane they took on responsibility for settlement of all of the CDS."
Specifically, I quote: "The Federal Reserve decided we should pay 100 cents on the dollar", but Mr. Issa nailed the truth on this in a followup - they could have purchased those contracts for far less in the open market at the time.
The bottom line is that the testimony was that The Fed decided to settle the contracts in a non-economic manner that resulted in screwing the taxpayer by transferring more than $100 billion dollars of taxpayer money out to these banks when the cash value at the time was FAR LESS.
(Mr. Issa, by the way, is one of the Congress folks who actually does understand securities - and it shows. He refused to let this go until he hammered it into the ground and got the answer in plain, irrefutable English.)
Is it any wonder how the banks managed to "report decent profits"?
The allegation just made by Liddy is that The Fed literally stole $100 billion dollars from you by intentionally overpaying on the settlement of these contracts!
(from market-ticker.org, May 13, 2009)
Allan Meltzer on the Coming Inflation
Housing market hasn't bottomed... I am worried about inflation two years from now... Fed should slow rate at which it increases the money growth