Friday, May 1, 2009

The Revolving Door Between Government and Wall Street

Glenn Greenwald, previously a constitutional law and civil rights litigator in New York, wrote on salon.com:

The ownership of the federal government by banks and other large corporations is effectuated in literally countless ways, none more effective than the endless and increasingly sleazy overlap between government and corporate officials. Here is just one random item this week announcing a couple of standard personnel moves:

Former Barney Frank staffer now top Goldman Sachs lobbyist

Goldman Sachs' new top lobbyist was recently the top staffer to Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., on the House Financial Services Committee chaired by Frank. Michael Paese, a registered lobbyist for the Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association since he left Frank's committee in September, will join Goldman as director of government affairs, a role held last year by former Tom Daschle intimate, Mark Patterson, now the chief of staff at the Treasury Department. This is not Paese's first swing through the Wall Street-Congress revolving door: he previously worked at JP Morgan and Mercantile Bankshares, and in between served as senior minority counsel at the Financial Services Committee.

So: Paese went from Chairman Frank's office to be the top lobbyist at Goldman, and shortly before that, Goldman dispatched Paese's predecessor, close Tom Daschle associate Mark Patterson, to be Chief of Staff to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, himself a protege of former Goldman CEO Robert Rubin and a virtually wholly owned subsidiary of the banking industry. That's all part of what Desmond Lachman -- American Enterprise Institute fellow, former chief emerging market strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and top IMF official (no socialist he) -- recently described as "Goldman Sachs's seeming lock on high-level U.S. Treasury jobs."

Read full article on salon.com "Top Senate Democrat: bankers "own" the U.S. Congress"

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Robert Arnott: Bonds: Why Bother?

Here is the conclusion of the popular article from Index Universe "Bonds: Why Bother?" written by Robert Arnott and published on April 20, 2009:

We manage assets in an equity-centric world. In the pages of the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and other financial presses, we see endless comparisons of the best equity funds, value funds, growth funds, large-cap funds, mid-cap funds, small-cap funds, international equity funds, sector funds, international regional funds and so forth. Balanced funds get some grudging acknowledgment. Bond funds are treated almost as the dull cousin, hidden in the attic.

This is no indictment of the financial press. They deliver the information that their readers demand, and bonds are—at first blush—less interesting. The same holds true for 401(k) offerings, which are overwhelmingly equity-centric. If 80–90 percent of the offerings provided to our employees are equity market strategies, is it any surprise that 80–90 percent of their assets are invested in stocks? And is it any surprise that they now feel angry and misled?

Many cherished myths drive our industry’s equity-centric worldview. The events of 2008 are shining a spotlight, for professionals and retail investors alike, on the folly of relying on false dogma.

* For the long-term investor, stocks are supposed to add 5 percent per year over bonds. They don’t. Indeed, for 10 years, 20 years, even 40 years, ordinary long-term Treasury bonds have outpaced the broad stock market.
* For the long-term investor, stock markets are supposed to give us steady gains, interrupted by periodic bear markets and occasional jolts like 1987 or 2008. The opposite—long periods of disappointment, interrupted by some wonderful gains—appears to be more accurate.
* For the long-term investor, mainstream bonds are supposed to reduce our risk and provide useful diversification, which can improve our long-term risk-adjusted returns. While they clearly reduce our risk, there are far more powerful ways to achieve true diversification—and many of them are out-of-mainstream segments of the bond market.
* Capitalization weighting is supposed to be the best way to construct a portfolio, whether for stocks or for bonds. The historical evidence is pretty solidly to the contrary.

As investors become increasingly aware that the conventional wisdom of modern investing is largely myth and urban legend, there will be growing demand for new ideas, and for more choices.

Why are there so many equity market mutual funds, diving into the smallest niche of the world’s stock markets, and so few specialty bond products, commodity products or other alternative market products? Today, investors are still reeling from the devastation of 2008, and the bleak equity results of this entire decade. They have already begun to notice that there were opportunities to earn gains, sometimes handsome gains, in a whole panoply of markets in the past decade—most of which are still difficult for the retail investor to access.

We’re in the early stages of a revolution in the index community, now fast extending into the bond arena. In the pages of this special issue of the Journal of Indexes, we see several elements of that revolution. In the months and years ahead, we will see the division between active and passive management become ever more blurred. We will see the introduction of innovative new products. The spectrum of bond and alternative product for the retail investor will quickly expand. We will shake off our overreliance on dogma. And our industry will be healthier for it.

Read full article

Post Factum... Jim Chanos: "We Need Honest Accounting"

As you know, the FASB approved relaxation of Mark-to-Market accounting rules despite protesting voices. But those voices must be remembered. Publishing post factum Jim Chanos arguments.

We Need Honest Accounting
Relax regulatory capital rules if need be, but don't let banks hide the truth.

By JAMES S. CHANOS

Mark-to-market (MTM) accounting is under fierce attack by bank CEOs and others who are pressing Congress to suspend, if not repeal, the rules they blame for the current financial crisis. Yet their pleas to bubble-wrap financial statements run counter to increased calls for greater financial-market transparency and ongoing efforts to restore investor trust.

We have a sorry history of the banking industry driving statutory and regulatory changes. Now banks want accounting fixes to mask their recklessness. Meanwhile, there has been no acknowledgment of culpability in what top management in these financial institutions did -- despite warnings -- to help bring about the crisis. Theirs is a record of lax risk management, flawed models, reckless lending, and excessively leveraged investment strategies. In the worst instances, they acted with moral indifference, knowing that what they were doing was flawed, but still willing to pocket the fees and accompanying bonuses.

MTM accounting isn't perfect, but it does provide a compass for investors to figure out what an asset would be worth in today's market if it were sold in an orderly fashion to a willing buyer. Before MTM took effect, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) produced much evidence to show that valuing financial instruments and other difficult-to-price assets by "historical" costs, or "mark to management," was folly.

The rules now under attack are neither as significant nor as inflexible as critics charge. MTM is generally limited to investments held for trading purposes, and to certain derivatives. For many financial institutions, these investments represent a minority of their total investment portfolio. A recent study by Bloomberg columnist David Reilly of the 12 largest banks in the KBW Bank Index shows that only 29% of the $8.46 trillion in assets are at MTM prices. In General Electric's case, the portion is just 2%.

Why is that so? Most bank assets are in loans, which are held at their original cost using amortization rules, minus a reserve that banks must set aside as a safety cushion for potential future losses.

MTM rules also give banks a choice. MTM accounting is not required for securities held to maturity, but you need to demonstrate a "positive intent and ability" that you will do so. Further, an SEC 2008 report found that "over 90% of investments marked-to-market are valued based on observable inputs."

Financial institutions had no problem in using MTM to benefit from the drop in prices of their own notes and bonds, since the rule also applies to liabilities. And when the value of the securitized loans they held was soaring, they eagerly embraced MTM. Once committed to that accounting discipline, though, they were obligated to continue doing so for the duration of their holding of securities they've marked to market. And one wonders if they are as equally willing to forego MTM for valuing the same illiquid securities in client accounts for margin loans as they are for their proprietary trading accounts?

But these facts haven't stopped the charge forward on Capitol Hill. At a recent hearing, bankers said that MTM forced them to price securities well below their real valuation, making it difficult to purge toxic assets from their books at anything but fire-sale prices. They also justified their attack with claims that loans, mortgages and other securities are now safe or close to safe, ignoring mounting evidence that losses are growing across a greater swath of credit. This makes the timing of the anti-MTM lobbying appear even more suspect. And not all financial firms are calling for loosening MTM standards; Goldman Sachs and others who are standing firm on this issue should be applauded.

According to J.P. Morgan, approximately $450 billion of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) of asset-backed securities were issued from late 2005 to mid-2007. Of that amount, roughly $305 billion is now in a formal state of default and $102 billion of this amount has already been liquidated. The latest monthly mortgage reports from investment banks are equally sobering. It is no surprise, then, that the largest underwriters of mortgages and CDOs have been decimated.

Commercial banking regulations generally do not require banks to sell assets to meet capital requirements just because market values decline. But if "impairment" charges under MTM do push banks below regulatory capital requirements and limit their ability to lend when they can't raise more capital, then the solution is to grant temporary regulatory capital "relief," which is itself an arbitrary number.

There is a connection between efforts over the past 12 years to reduce regulatory oversight, weaken capital requirements, and silence the financial detectives who uncovered such scandals as Lehman and Enron. The assault against MTM is just the latest chapter.

Instead of acknowledging mistakes, we are told this is a "once in 100 years" anomaly with the market not functioning correctly. It isn't lost on investors that the MTM criticisms come, too, as private equity firms must now report the value of their investments. The truth is the market is functioning correctly. It's just that MTM critics don't like the prices that investors are willing to pay.

The FASB and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must stand firm in their respective efforts to ensure that investors get a true sense of the losses facing banks and investment firms. To be sure, we should work to make MTM accounting more precise, following, for example, the counsel of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets and the SEC's December 2008 recommendations for achieving greater clarity in valuation approaches.

Unfortunately, the FASB proposal on March 16 represents capitulation. It calls for "significant judgment" by banks in determining if a market or an asset is "inactive" and if a transaction is "distressed." This would give banks more discretion to throw out "quotes" and use valuation alternatives, including cash-flow estimates, to determine value in illiquid markets. In other words, it allows banks to substitute their own wishful-thinking judgments of value for market prices.

The FASB is also changing the criteria used to determine impairment, giving companies more flexibility to not recognize impairments if they don't have "the intent to sell." Banks will only need to state that they are more likely than not to be able to hold onto an underwater asset until its price "recovers." CFOs will also have a choice to divide impairments into "credit losses" and "other losses," which means fewer of these charges will be counted against income. If approved, companies could start this quarter to report net income that ignores sharp declines in securities they own. The FASB is taking comments until April 1, but its vote is a fait accompli.

Obfuscating sound accounting rules by gutting MTM rules will only further reduce investors' trust in the financial statements of all companies, causing private capital -- desperately needed in securities markets -- to become even scarcer. Worse, obfuscation will further erode confidence in the American economy, with dire consequences for the very financial institutions who are calling for MTM changes. If need be, temporarily relax the arbitrary levels of regulatory capital, rather than compromise the integrity of all financial statements.

Mr. Chanos is chairman of the Coalition of Private Investment Companies and founder and president of Kynikos Associates LP.

(from WSJ, March 23, 2009)

At Least Six of the 19 Largest U.S. Banks Require Additional Capital

At least six of the 19 largest U.S. banks require additional capital, according to preliminary results of government stress tests, people briefed on the matter said.

While some of the lenders may need extra cash injections from the government, most of the capital is likely to come from converting preferred shares to common equity, the people said. The Federal Reserve is now hearing appeals from banks, including Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., that regulators have determined need more of a cushion against losses, they added.

By pushing conversions, rather than federal assistance, the government would allow banks to shore themselves up without the political taint that has soured both Wall Street and Congress on the bailouts. The risk is that, along with diluting existing shareholders, the government action won’t seem strong enough.

“The challenge that policy makers will confront is that more will be needed and it’s not clear they have the resources currently in place or the political capability to deliver more,” said David Greenlaw, the chief financial economist at Morgan Stanley, one of the 19 banks that are being tested, in New York.

Final results of the tests are due to be released next week. The banking agencies overseeing the reviews and the Treasury are still debating how much of the information to disclose. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and other regulators are scheduled to meet this week to discuss the tests.

Geithner has said that banks can add capital by a variety of ways, including converting government-held preferred shares dating from capital injections made last year, raising private funds or getting more taxpayer cash. With regulators putting an emphasis on common equity in their stress tests, converting privately held preferred shares is another option.

Firms that receive exceptional assistance could face stiffer government controls, including the firing of executives or board members, the Treasury chief has warned.

Geithner today endorsed legislation before Congress that would tighten oversight of credit card fees, interest rates and penalties, saying banks should view the pending legislation as a sign of what lies ahead.

“This is a very important signal,” Geithner told reporters after a meeting at the Treasury. “I think it’s important that we see that affect behavior.”

Also today, Bank of America Corp. shareholders re-elected the entire 18-member board including Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis, according to a person familiar with the matter.

The directors were re-elected by a “comfortable margin,” according to the person, who declined to be identified because the results hadn’t been made public. While Lewis has been at the helm, the bank has received $45 billion in government aid.

Lewis said earlier this month that the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank “absolutely” doesn’t need more capital, while adding that the decision on whether to convert the U.S.’s previous investments into common equity is “now out of our hands.”

Citigroup, in a statement, said the bank’s “regulatory capital base is strong, and we have previously announced our intention to conduct an exchange offer that will significantly improve our tangible common ratios.”

Along with Bank of America and New York-based Citigroup, some regional banks are likely to need additional capital, analysts have said.

SunTrust Banks Inc., KeyCorp, and Regions Financial Corp. are the banks that are most likely to require more capital, according to an April 24 analysis by Morgan Stanley.

By taking the less onerous path of converting preferred shares, the Treasury is husbanding the diminishing resources from the $700 billion bailout passed by Congress last October.

“Does that indicate that’s what the regulators actually believe, or is it that they felt politically constrained from doing much more than that?” said Douglas Elliott, a former investment banker who is now a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

Geithner said April 21 that $109.6 billion of TARP funds remain, or $134.6 billion including expected repayments in the coming year. Lawmakers have warned repeatedly not to expect approval of any request for additional money.

Some forecasts predict much greater losses are still on the horizon for the financial system. The International Monetary Fund calculates global losses tied to bad loans and securitized assets may reach $4.1 trillion next year.

Geithner has said repeatedly that the “vast majority” of U.S. banks have more capital than regulatory guidelines indicate. The stress tests are designed to ensure that firms have enough reserves to weather a deeper economic downturn and sustain lending to consumers and businesses.

He also said there are signs of “thawing” in credit markets and some indication that confidence is beginning to return. His remarks reflected an improvement in earnings in several lenders’ results for the first quarter, and a reduction in benchmark lending rates this month.

Financial shares are poised for their first back-to-back monthly gain since September 2007. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Financials Index has climbed 18 percent this month, while still 73 percent below the high reached in May 2007.

Finance ministers and central bankers who met in Washington last weekend singled out banks’ impaired balance sheets as the biggest threat to a sustainable recovery. Geithner has crafted a plan to finance purchases of as much as $1 trillion in distressed loans and securities. Germany has proposed removing $1.1 trillion in toxic assets.

(from Bloomberg, April 29, 2009)

Ron Grassi Takes on Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings

Ron Grassi says he thought he had retired five years ago after a 35-year career as a trial lawyer.

Now Grassi, 68, has set up a war room in his Tahoe City, California, home to single-handedly take on Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings. He’s sued the three credit rating firms for negligence, fraud and deceit.

Grassi says the companies’ faulty debt analyses have been at the core of the global financial meltdown and the firms should be held accountable. Exhibit One is his own investment. He and his wife, Sally, held $40,000 in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. bonds because all three credit raters gave them at least an A rating -- meaning they were a safe investment -- right until Sept. 15, the day Lehman filed for bankruptcy.

“They’re supposed to spot time bombs,” Grassi says. “The bombs exploded before the credit companies acted.”

As the U.S. and other economic powers devise ways to overhaul financial regulations, they have yet to come up with plans to address one issue at the heart of the crisis: the role of the rating firms.

That’s partly because the reach of the three big credit raters extends into virtually every corner of the financial system. Everyone from banks to the agencies that regulate them is hooked on ratings.

Debt grades are baked into hundreds of rules, laws and private contracts that affect banking, insurance, mutual funds and pension funds. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission guidelines, for example, require money market fund managers to rely on ratings in deciding what to buy with $3.9 trillion of investors’ money.

State regulators depend on credit grades to monitor the safety of $450 billion of bonds held by U.S. insurance companies. Even the plans crafted by Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner to stimulate the economy count on rating firms to determine how the money will be spent.

“The key to policy going forward has to be to stop our reliance on these credit ratings,” says Frank Partnoy, a professor at the San Diego School of Law and a former derivatives trader who has written four books on modern finance, including Infectious Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Times Books, 2003).

“Even though few people respect the credit raters, most continue to rely on them,” Partnoy says. “We’ve become addicted to them like a drug, and we have to figure out a way to wean regulators and investors off of them.”

Just how critical a role ratings firms play in the health and stability of the financial system became clear in the case of American International Group Inc., the New York-based insurer that’s now a ward of the U.S. government.

On Sept. 16, one day after the three credit rating firms downgraded AIG’s double-A score by two to three grades, private contract provisions that AIG had with banks around the world based on credit rating changes forced the insurer to hand over billions of dollars of collateral to its customers. The company didn’t have the cash.

Trying to avert a global financial cataclysm, the Federal Reserve rescued AIG with an $85 billion loan -- the first of four U.S. bailouts of the insurer.

Investors, traders and regulators have been questioning whether credit rating companies serve a good purpose ever since Enron Corp. imploded in 2001. Until four days before the Houston-based energy company filed for what was then the largest-ever U.S. bankruptcy, its debt had investment-grade stamps of approval from S&P, Moody’s and Fitch.

In the run-up to the current financial crisis, credit companies evolved from evaluators of debt into consultants.

They helped banks create $3.2 trillion of subprime mortgage securities. Typically, the firms awarded triple-A ratings to 75 percent of those debt packages.

“Ratings agencies just abjectly failed in serving the interests of investors,” SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey says.

S&P President Deven Sharma says he knows his firm is taking heat from all sides -- and he expects to turn that around.

“Our company has always operated by the principle that if you do the right thing by the customers and the market, ultimately you’ll succeed,” Sharma says.

Moody’s Chief Executive Officer Raymond McDaniel and Fitch CEO Stephen Joynt declined to comment for this story.

“We are firmly committed to meeting the highest standards of integrity in our ratings practice,” McDaniel said in an April 15 SEC hearing.

“We remain committed to the highest standards of integrity and objectivity in all aspects of our work,” Joynt told the SEC.

Notwithstanding the role the credit companies played in fomenting disaster, the U.S. government is relying on them to help fix the system they had a hand in breaking.

The Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, or TALF, will finance the purchase by taxpayers of as much as $1 trillion of new securities backed by consumer loans or other asset-backed debt -- on the condition they have triple-A ratings.

And the Fed has also been buying commercial paper directly from companies since October, only if the debt has at least the equivalent of an A-1 rating, the second highest for short-term credit. The three rating companies graded Lehman debt A-1 the day it filed for bankruptcy.

The Fed’s financial rescue is good for the bottom lines of the three rating firms, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal says. They could enjoy as much as $400 million in fees that come from taxpayer money, he says.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch, all based in New York, got their official blessing from the SEC in 1975, when the regulator named them Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations.

Seven companies, along with the big three, now have SEC licensing. The regulator created the NRSRO designation after deciding to set capital requirements for broker-dealers. The SEC relies on ratings from the NRSROs to evaluate the bond holdings of those firms.

At the core of the rating system is an inherent conflict of interest, says Lawrence White, the Arthur E. Imperatore Professor of Economics at New York University in Manhattan. Credit raters are paid by the companies whose debt they analyze, so the ratings might reflect a bias, he says.

“So long as you are delegating these decisions to for- profit companies, inevitably there are going to be conflicts,” he says.

In a March 25 report, policy makers from the Group of 20 nations recommended that credit rating companies be supervised to provide more transparency, improve rating quality and avoid conflicts of interest. The G-20 didn’t offer specifics.

As lawmakers scratch their heads over how to come up with an alternative approach, the rating firms continue to pull in rich profits.

Moody’s, the only one of the three that stands alone as a publicly traded company, has averaged pretax profit margins of 52 percent over the past five years. It reported revenue of $1.76 billion -- earning a pretax margin of 41 percent -- even during the economic collapse in 2008.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch control 98 percent of the market for debt ratings in the U.S., according to the SEC. The noncompetitive market leads to high fees, says SEC Commissioner Casey, 43, appointed by President George W. Bush in July 2006 to a five-year term. S&P, a unit of McGraw-Hill Cos., has profit margins similar to those at Moody’s, she says.

“They’ve benefited from the monopoly status that they’ve achieved with a tremendous amount of assistance from regulators,” Casey says.

Sharma, 53, says S&P has justifiably earned its income.

“Why does anybody pay $200, or whatever, for Air Jordan shoes?” he asks, sitting in a company boardroom high over the southern tip of Manhattan. “It’s the same. People see value in that. And it all boils down to the value of what people see in it.”

Blumenthal says he sees little value in credit ratings. He says raters shouldn’t be getting money from federal financial rescue efforts.

“It rewards the very incompetence of Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch that helped cause our current financial crisis,” he says. “It enables those specific credit rating agencies to profit from their own self-enriching malfeasance.”

Blumenthal has subpoenaed documents from the three companies to determine if they improperly influenced the TALF rules to snatch business from smaller rivals.

S&P and Fitch deny Blumenthal’s accusations.

“The investigation by the Connecticut attorney general is without merit,” S&P Vice President Chris Atkins says. “The attorney general fails to recognize S&P’s strong track record rating consumer asset-backed securities, the assets that will be included in the TALF program. S&P’s fees for this work are subject to fee caps.”

Fitch Managing Director David Weinfurter says the government makes all the rules -- not the rating firms.

“Fitch Ratings views Blumenthal’s investigation into credit ratings eligibility requirements under TALF and other federal lending programs as an unfortunate development stemming from incomplete or inaccurate information,” he says.

Moody’s Senior Vice President Anthony Mirenda declined to comment.

Sharma says it’s clear that his firm’s housing market assumptions were incorrect. S&P is making its methodology clearer so investors can better decide whether they agree with the ratings, he says.

“The thing to do is make it transparent, ‘Here are our criteria. Here are our analytics. Here are our assumptions. Here are the stress-test scenarios. And now, if you have any questions, talk to us,’” Sharma says.

The rating companies reaped a bonanza in fees earlier this decade as they worked with financial firms to manufacture collateralized debt obligations. Those creations held a mix of questionable debt, including subprime mortgages, auto loans and junk-rated assets.

S&P, Moody’s and Fitch won as much as three times more in fees for grading structured securities than they charged for rating ordinary bonds. The CDO market started to crash in mid- 2007, as investors learned the securities were jammed with bad debt.

Financial firms around the world have reported about $1.3 trillion in writedowns and losses in the past two years.

Alex Pollock, now a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, says more competition among credit raters would reduce fees.

“The rating agencies are an SEC-created cartel,” he says. “Usually, issuers need at least two ratings, so they don’t even have to compete.”

Pollock was president of the Federal Home Loan Bank in Chicago from 1991 to 2004. The bank was rated triple-A by both Moody’s and S&P. He says he recalls an annual ritual as he visited with representatives of each company.

“They’d say, ‘Here’s what it’s going to cost,’” he says. “I’d say, ‘That’s outrageous.’ They’d repeat, ‘This is what it’s going to cost.’ Finally, I’d say, ‘OK.’ With no ratings, you can’t sell your debt.”

Congress has held hearings on credit raters routinely this decade, first in 2002 after Enron and then again each year through 2008. In 2006, Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which gave the SEC limited authority to regulate raters’ business practices.

The SEC adopted rules under the law in December 2008 banning rating firms from grading debt structures they designed themselves. The law forbids the SEC from ordering the firms to change their analytical methods.

Only Congress has the power to overhaul the rating system. So far, nobody has introduced legislation that would do that. In a hearing on April 15, the SEC heard suggestions for legislation on credit raters. Some of the loudest proponents for change are in state government and on Wall Street. But no one’s agreed on how to do it.

“We should replace ratings agencies,” says Peter Fisher, managing director and co-head of fixed income at New York-based BlackRock Inc., the largest publicly traded U.S. asset management company.

“Our credit rating system is anachronistic,” he says. “Eighty years ago, equities were thought to be complicated and bonds were thought to be simple, so it appeared to make sense to have a few rating agencies set up to tell us all what bonds to buy. But flash forward to the slicing and dicing of credit today, and it’s really a pretty wacky concept.”

To create competition, the U.S. should license individuals, not companies, as credit rating professionals, Fisher says. They should be more like equity analysts and would be primarily paid by institutional investors, Fisher says. Neither equity analysts nor those who work at rating companies currently need to be licensed.

Such a system wouldn’t be fair, says Daniel Fuss, vice chairman of Boston-based Loomis Sayles & Co., which manages $106 billion. An investor-pay ratings model may give the biggest money managers a huge advantage over smaller firms and individuals because they can afford to pay for the analyses, he says. “What about individuals?” he asks.

Eric Dinallo, New York’s top insurance regulator, proposes a government takeover of the rating business.

“There’s nothing wrong with saying Moody’s or someone is going to just become a government agency,” he says. “We’ve hung the entire global economy on ratings.”

Insurance companies are among the world’s largest bond investors. Dinallo suggests that insurers could fund a credit rating collective run by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, a group of state regulators.

“It would be like the Consumer Reports of credit ratings,” Dinallo says, referring to the not-for-profit magazine that provides unbiased reviews of consumer products.

Turning over the credit ratings to a consortium headed by state governments could lead to lower quality because there would be even less competition, Fuss says.

“I would be strongly opposed to the government taking over the function of credit ratings,” he says. “I just don’t think it would work at all. The business creativity, the drive, would go straight out of it.”

At the April 15 SEC hearing, Joseph Grundfest, a professor at Stanford Law School in Stanford, California, suggested a variation of Dinallo’s idea. He said the SEC could authorize a new kind of rating company, owned and run by the largest debt investors.

All bond issuers that pay for a traditional rating would also have to buy a credit analysis from one of these firms.

SEC Commissioner Casey has another solution. She wants to remove rating requirements from federal guidelines. She also faults investors for shirking their responsibility to do independent research, rather than simply looking to the grades produced by credit raters.

“I’d like to promote greater competition in the market and greater discipline,” she says. “Eliminating the references to ratings will play a huge role in removing the undue reliance that we’ve seen.”

Sharma, who became president of S&P in August 2007, agrees with Casey that ratings are too enmeshed in SEC rules. He wants the SEC to either get rid of references to rating companies in regulations or add other benchmarks such as current market prices, volatility and liquidity.

“Just don’t leave us the way it is today,” Sharma says. “There’s too much risk of being overused and inappropriately used.”

Sharma says that even with widespread regulatory reliance on ratings, his firm will lose business if investors say it doesn’t produce accurate ones.

“Our reputation is hurt now,” he says. “Let’s say it continues to be hurt; it never comes back. Three other competitors come back who do much-better-quality work. Investors will finally say, ‘I don’t want S&P ratings.’”

S&P will prove to the public that it can help companies and bondholders by updating and clarifying its rating methodology, Sharma says. The company will also add commentary on the liquidity and volatility of securities.

S&P has incorporated so-called credit stability into its ratings to address the risk that ratings will fall several levels under stress conditions, which is what happened to CDO grades. The company has also created an ombudsman office in an effort to resolve potential conflicts of interest.

Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody’s for 17 years and was managing director for credit policy until August 2007, says investors don’t have to wait for a change in the rating system. They can learn more about the value of debt by tracking the prices of credit-default swaps, he says.

The swaps, which are derivatives, are an unregulated type of insurance in which one side bets that a company will default and the other side, or counterparty, gambles that the firm won’t fail. The higher the price of that protection, the greater the perceived risk of default.

“We know the spreads are more accurate than ratings,” says Fons, now principal of Fons Risk Solutions, a credit risk consulting firm in New York. Moody’s sells a service called Moody’s Implied Ratings, which is based on prices of credit swaps, debt and stock.

In July 2007, credit-default-swap traders started pricing Bear Stearns Cos. and Lehman as if they were Ba1 rated, the highest junk level. They pegged Merrill Lynch & Co. as a Ba1 credit three months later, according to the Moody’s model.

Each of those investment banks was stamped at investment grade by the top three credit raters within weeks of when the banks either failed or were rescued in 2008.

Lynn Tilton, who manages $6 billion as CEO of private equity firm Patriarch Partners in New York, says she woke up one morning in August 2007 convinced the banking system would collapse and started buying gold coins.

“I predicted the banks would be insolvent,” Tilton says. “My biggest issue was credit-default swaps. When the size of that market started to dwarf gross domestic product by six or seven times, then my understanding of what defaults would be in a down market became clear: There’s no escaping.”

Investors like Tilton watched as the financial firms tumbled while credit raters held on to investment-grade marks.

“If the ratings mandate weren’t there, we wouldn’t care because the credit-default-swap markets can tell us basically what we want to know about default probabilities,” NYU’s White says. “I’m a market-oriented guy, so I’m more inclined to be relying on the collective wisdom of the market participants.”

While credit-default-swap traders lack inside information that companies give to credit raters, swap traders move faster because they’re reacting to market changes every day.

San Diego School of Law’s Partnoy, who’s written law review articles about credit rating firms for more than a decade and has been a paid consultant to plaintiffs suing rating companies, says raters hold back from downgrading because they know the consequences can be dire.

In September, Moody’s and S&P downgraded AIG to A2 and A-, the sixth- and seventh-highest investment-grade ratings. The downgrades triggered CDS payouts and led to the U.S. lending AIG $85 billion. The government has since more than doubled AIG’s rescue funds.

“When you get into a situation like we’re in right now with AIG, the rating agencies are basically trapped into maintaining high ratings because they know if they downgrade, they don’t only have this regulatory effect but they have all these effects,” Partnoy says.

“It’s all this stuff that basically turns the rating downgrade into a bullet fired at the heart of a bunch of institutions,” he says.

Sharma says S&P has never delayed a ratings change because of potential downgrade results. He says his firm tells clients not to use ratings as triggers in private contracts.

“We take action based on what we feel is right,” Sharma says.

While swap prices may be better than bond ratings at predicting a disaster, swaps can also cause a disaster.

AIG, one of the world’s biggest sellers of CDS protection, nearly collapsed -- taking the global financial system with it -- when it didn’t have enough cash to honor its swaps contracts. Loomis’s Fuss says relying on swap prices is a bad idea.

“The market is not always right,” he says. “An unregulated market isn’t always a fair appraisal of value.”

Moody’s was the first credit rating firm in the U.S. It started grading railroad bonds in 1909. Standard Statistics, a precursor of S&P, began rating securities seven years later.

After the 1929 stock market crash, the government decided it wasn’t able to determine the quality of the assets held by banks on its own, Partnoy says. In 1931, the U.S. Treasury started using bond ratings to analyze banks’ holdings.

James O’Connor, then comptroller of the currency, issued a regulation in 1936 restricting banks to buying only securities that were deemed high quality by at least two credit raters.

“One of the major responses was to try to find a way -- just as we are now with the stress tests and the examination of the banks -- to figure out how to get the bad assets off the banks’ books,” Partnoy says.

Since then, regulators have increasingly leaned on ratings to police debt investing. In 1991, the SEC ruled that money market mutual fund managers must put 95 percent of their investments into highly rated commercial paper.

Like auditors, lawyers and investment bankers, rating firms serve as gatekeepers to the financial markets. They provide assurances to bond investors. Unlike the others, ratings companies have generally avoided liability for errors.

Grassi, the retired California lawyer, wants to change that. He filed his lawsuit against the rating companies on Jan. 26 in state superior court in Placer County.

The white-haired lawyer discusses his case seated at a tiny wooden desk in his small guest bedroom, with files spread over both levels of a bunk bed. Grassi says in his complaint that the raters were negligent for failing to downgrade Lehman Brothers debt as the bank’s finances were deteriorating.

The day Lehman filed for bankruptcy, S&P rated the investment bank’s debt as A, which according to S&P’s definition means a “strong” capacity to meet financial commitments. Moody’s rated Lehman A2 that day, which Moody’s defines as a “low credit risk.” Fitch gave Lehman a grade of A+, which it describes as “high credit quality.”

“We’d like to have a jury hear this,” Grassi says. “This wouldn’t be six economists, just six normal people. That would scare the rating agencies to death.”

The rating companies haven’t yet filed responses. They’ve asked the federal court in Sacramento to take jurisdiction from the state court.

S&P and Fitch say they dispute Grassi’s allegations. “We believe the complaint is without merit and intend to defend against it vigorously,” S&P’s Atkins says.

Fitch’s Weinfurter says, “The lawsuit is fully without merit and we will vigorously defend it.”

Mirenda at Moody’s declined to comment.

S&P included a standard disclaimer with Lehman’s ratings: “Any user of the information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other opinion contained herein in making any investment decision.”

Grassi isn’t deterred.

“They’re saying we know you’re going to rely on us and if you get screwed, you’re on your own because our lawyers have told us to put this paragraph in here,” he says.

The companies have defended their ratings from lawsuits, arguing that they were just opinions, protected by the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

McGraw-Hill used the First Amendment defense in 1996 after its subsidiary S&P was sued for professional negligence by Orange County, California. S&P had given the county an AA- rating before the county filed for the largest-ever municipal bankruptcy.

Orange County alleged in its lawsuit that S&P had failed to warn the government that its treasurer, Robert Citron, had made risky investments with county cash.

The U.S. District Court in Santa Ana, California, ruled that the county would have needed to prove the rating company’s “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth” to win damages.

The court found that the credit rater couldn’t be held liable for mere negligence, agreeing with S&P that it was shielded by the First Amendment.

Sharma says rating companies shouldn’t be responsible when investors misuse ratings.

“Hold us accountable for what you can,” he says. He compares the rating companies to carmakers. “Look, if you drove the car wrong, the manufacturer can’t be held negligent. But if you designed the car wrong, then of course the manufacturer should be held negligent.”

The bigger issue is whether the credit rating system should be changed or even abolished. From California to New York to Washington, investors and regulators are saying it doesn’t work. No one has been able to fix it.

The federal government created the rating cartel, and the U.S. is as dependent on it as everyone else. So far, the legislative branch hasn’t cleaned up the ratings mess.

“This problem really is like a cancer that has spread throughout the entire investment system,” Partnoy says. “You’ve got a body filled with little tumors, and you’ve got to go through and find them and cut them out.”

As the U.S. has spent, lent or pledged about $12.8 trillion in efforts to revive the slumping economy, and as President Barack Obama and Congress have worked overtime to find a way out of the deepest recession in 70 years, no one has taken steps that would substantially fix a broken ratings system.

If the government doesn’t head in that direction, all of its efforts at financial reform may be put in jeopardy by the one piece of this puzzle that nobody has yet figured out how to solve.

(from Bloomberg, April 29, 2009)