David Walker is a man on a mission. As U.S. comptroller general, he used the bully pulpit to fuel a campaign of town hall meetings highlighting the country’s ballooning federal deficit. The Fiscal Wake-Up Tour and the publicity it generated begat the documentary I.O.U.S.A. Walker hopes the film will do for fiscal irresponsibility what Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth did for global warming—mobilize new citizen activists and pressure politicians to act.
A year ago, Walker stepped away from the five-plus remaining years on his term as comptroller general and head of the Government Accountability Office. He had been recruited by billionaire Pete Peterson, a co-founder of the private -equity fund The Blackstone Group, to become president and CEO of Peterson’s foundation. The Peter G. Peterson Foundation, a nonprofit to which Peterson has pledged $1 billion, focuses on issues such as the deficit, savings levels, entitlement benefits, health care costs, and the nation’s tax system.
Walker talked with the Journal of Accountancy (JofA) recently about the deficit and the financial crisis. What follow are excerpts from that conversation.
JofA: What did you hope to accomplish when you set out on your speaking tour and got involved with the documentary I.O.U.S.A., and what progress has been made on those goals?
Walker: I have been to over 42 states, giving speeches, participating in town hall meetings, meeting with business community leaders, local television and radio stations, and editorial boards with the objective of trying to state the facts and speak the truth about the deteriorating financial condition of the United States government and the need for us to start making some tough choices on budget controls, tax policy, entitlement reform and spending constraints. And the good news is that people get it. The American people are a lot smarter than many people give them credit for—especially elected officials
Well, a lot has happened since we started the Fiscal Wake-Up Tour. Two significant events would be the 60 Minutes piece, which ran twice in 2007, and that led to the commercial documentary I.O.U.S.A. (see a 30-minute version of the documentary at www.iousathemovie.com). So there’s a lot more visibility on our issue, and I think that’s encouraging. The other thing that has happened is the recent market meltdown and bailouts of some very venerable institutions in the financial services industry have served to bring things home to America. The concept of “too big to fail” is just not reality anymore, and when you take on too much debt and you don’t have adequate cash flow, some very bad things can happen.
Here’s the key. The factors that led to the mortgage-based subprime crisis exist for the federal government’s finances. Therefore, we must take steps to avoid a super subprime crisis, which frankly would have much more disastrous effects not only domestically but around the world.
JofA: How does the economic crisis affect your message and the outlook for the kind of wide-scale changes you think need to be made?
Walker: What’s critical is that we take advantage of the teachable moment associated with the market meltdown and the failure of some of the most prominent financial institutions in the country to help the American people know that nobody can live beyond his means forever. And that goes for government, too.
We have a new president, and therefore we have an opportunity to press the reset button, and I hope President Obama will do two things: That he will assure Americans that he will do what it takes to turn the economy around. I think it is critically important that he also focus on the future and be able to put a mechanism in place like a fiscal future commission so that once we turn the corner on the economy, we have a set of recommendations Congress and the president would be able to consider about budget controls, tax reform, entitlement reform—things that are clear and compelling that we need to act on.
Individuals need to understand that the government has overpromised and under-delivered for far too long. It is going to have to engage in some dramatic and fundamental reform of existing entitlement programs, spending policies and tax policies. The government will be there to provide a safety net through Social Security, a foundation of retirement security, and it will be there to help those that are in need. In general, most individuals are going to have to assume more responsibility for their own financial future, and the earlier they understand that the better off they are going to be. They need to have a financial plan, a budget, make prudent use of debt, save, invest their savings for specified purposes and, very importantly, preserve their savings for the intended purpose, including retirement income.
I believe the government policies are going to have to encourage people to work longer by increasing the eligibility ages for many government programs. So if people want to retire at an earlier age, they are going to have to plan, save, invest and preserve those savings for retirement purposes.
JofA: You’ve called the current U.S. health care system unsustainable. How can the system be fixed without negatively affecting the care Americans need?
Walker: Our current health care system is not really a system. It’s an amalgamation of a bunch of different things that have occurred over the years, and it’s unacceptable and unsustainable. We spend twice per capita what any other country on the Earth does. We have the highest uninsured population of any industrialized nation. We have below average health care outcomes. So the value of the equation just does not compute.
We are going to need to do two things on health care. We are going to need to take some steps quickly to reduce the rate of increase in health care cost. We are also going to have to better target taxpayer subsidies and tax preferences for health care.
We are also going to end up needing to move toward trying to achieve comprehensive health care reform that accomplishes four key goals. First: achieve universal coverage for basic and essential health care—based on broad-based societal needs, not unlimited individual wants—that’s affordable and sustainable over time and that avoids taxpayer-funded heroic measures. Secondly, the federal government has to have a budget for health care. We are the only nation on Earth dumb enough to write a blank check for health care. It could bankrupt the country. We have to have constraints. Thirdly, we need national evidence-based practice standards for the practice of medicine and for the issuance of prescription drugs to improve consistency, enhance quality, reduce costs and dramatically reduce litigation risks. And last, but certainly not least, we have to require personal responsibility and accountability for our own health and wellness in a whole range of areas including obesity.
JofA: What drives you?
Walker: My family has been in this country since the 1680s, and I have ancestors who fought and died in the American Revolution. So I care very deeply about this country, and I am a big history buff. I believe you need to study history in order to learn from it in order not to make some of the same mistakes that others have made in the past.
Secondly, I am only the second person in my direct Walker line to graduate from college. My dad was the first. Therefore, I am somewhat of an example of what someone can accomplish in this great country if you get an education, if you have a positive attitude, if you work hard, if you have good morals and ethical values.
My personal mission in life is to be able to make a difference, to try and make a difference in the lives of others, to try and help make sure our country stays strong, that the American dream stays alive, and that the future will be better for my children and my grandchildren
Wednesday, April 8, 2009
An Argument Against Using Government Funds to Help Purchase Structured Credit Securities
Coval of Harvard business school and Jurek of Princeton co-wrote a paper that investigates the current prices of debt: "The Pricing of Investment Grade Credit Risk during the Financial Crisis", Joshua D. Coval, Jakub W. Jurek, and Erik Stafford, March 30, 2009.
The bottom line of the paper:
Policymakers are rapidly moving towards using TARP money to purchase toxic assets – primarily tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – from banks, with the aim of supporting secondary markets and increasing bank lending. The key premise of current policies is that the prices for these assets have become artificially depressed by banks and other investors trying to unload their holdings in an illiquid market, such that they no longer reflect their true hold-to-maturity value. By purchasing or insuring a large quantity of bank assets, the government can restore liquidity to credit markets and solvency to the banking sector.
The analysis in this paper suggests that recent credit market prices are actually highly consistent with fundamentals. A structural framework confirms that bonds and credit derivatives should have experienced a significant repricing in 2008 as the economic outlook darkened and volatility increased. The analysis also confirms that severe mispricing existed in the structured credit tranches prior to the crisis and that a large part of the dramatic rise in spreads has been the elimination of this mispricing.
If prices currently coming out of credit markets are actually correct, and not reflecting fire sales, this has several important implications. First, correct prices in the secondary market for these assets essentially imply that many major US banks are now legitimately insolvent. This insolvency can longer be viewed as an artifact of bank assets being marked to artificially depressed prices coming out of an illiquid market. It means that bank assets are being fairly priced at valuations that sum to less than bank liabilities. In turn, any positive valuation assigned by shareholders to their equity claim arises solely from their anticipation of value transfer from firm debt holders or resource transfers from US taxpayers.
Second, if current market prices are fair, any taxpayer dollars allocated to supporting these markets will simply transfer wealth to the current owners of these securities. To the extent these assets reside in banks that are now insolvent, the owners are essentially the bondholders of these banks. The reason their bonds are currently trading far below par is that the assets backing up their claim are just not worth enough (nor expected to become worth enough when their bonds mature) to repay them. And so while they will be cheered by any government overpayment for the toxic assets backing up their claims, their happiness will be at the taxpayer’s expense since – to the extent that current prices are fair – they will be receiving more than fair value for their investments. Similarly, using government resources to support these markets by insuring assets against further losses amounts to providing insurance at premia that are significantly below what is fair for the risks that the US taxpayer will now bear.
Third, the market for securitized claims is not going to operate the same way it did in the past. Investors in these assets are setting prices in the secondary market that reflect both the high expected losses of the securities and the highly systematic nature of these expected losses. And while the pricing of these securities is dramatically different from the way it was a year or two ago, this is because it was wrong then, not now. Efforts to restart this market are focused on resuming the flawed pricing of the past, when there was no charge for risk and investors relied on the accuracy of ratings. Investors have learned from their mistakes and now seem to be pricing these securities in accordance with their true risks.
The bottom line of the paper:
Policymakers are rapidly moving towards using TARP money to purchase toxic assets – primarily tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – from banks, with the aim of supporting secondary markets and increasing bank lending. The key premise of current policies is that the prices for these assets have become artificially depressed by banks and other investors trying to unload their holdings in an illiquid market, such that they no longer reflect their true hold-to-maturity value. By purchasing or insuring a large quantity of bank assets, the government can restore liquidity to credit markets and solvency to the banking sector.
The analysis in this paper suggests that recent credit market prices are actually highly consistent with fundamentals. A structural framework confirms that bonds and credit derivatives should have experienced a significant repricing in 2008 as the economic outlook darkened and volatility increased. The analysis also confirms that severe mispricing existed in the structured credit tranches prior to the crisis and that a large part of the dramatic rise in spreads has been the elimination of this mispricing.
If prices currently coming out of credit markets are actually correct, and not reflecting fire sales, this has several important implications. First, correct prices in the secondary market for these assets essentially imply that many major US banks are now legitimately insolvent. This insolvency can longer be viewed as an artifact of bank assets being marked to artificially depressed prices coming out of an illiquid market. It means that bank assets are being fairly priced at valuations that sum to less than bank liabilities. In turn, any positive valuation assigned by shareholders to their equity claim arises solely from their anticipation of value transfer from firm debt holders or resource transfers from US taxpayers.
Second, if current market prices are fair, any taxpayer dollars allocated to supporting these markets will simply transfer wealth to the current owners of these securities. To the extent these assets reside in banks that are now insolvent, the owners are essentially the bondholders of these banks. The reason their bonds are currently trading far below par is that the assets backing up their claim are just not worth enough (nor expected to become worth enough when their bonds mature) to repay them. And so while they will be cheered by any government overpayment for the toxic assets backing up their claims, their happiness will be at the taxpayer’s expense since – to the extent that current prices are fair – they will be receiving more than fair value for their investments. Similarly, using government resources to support these markets by insuring assets against further losses amounts to providing insurance at premia that are significantly below what is fair for the risks that the US taxpayer will now bear.
Third, the market for securitized claims is not going to operate the same way it did in the past. Investors in these assets are setting prices in the secondary market that reflect both the high expected losses of the securities and the highly systematic nature of these expected losses. And while the pricing of these securities is dramatically different from the way it was a year or two ago, this is because it was wrong then, not now. Efforts to restart this market are focused on resuming the flawed pricing of the past, when there was no charge for risk and investors relied on the accuracy of ratings. Investors have learned from their mistakes and now seem to be pricing these securities in accordance with their true risks.
Monday, April 6, 2009
Diane Garnick on Relaxing "Mark to Market": "There is no Accounting for Politics"
I admire Diane Garnick for her down to earth attitude and talking sense in the midst of any speculation. She is now an investment strategist at Invesco Plc, managing around $400B.
Here is what she told Bloomberg analyzing the ongoing recession and criticizing blurring financial accounting instead of increasing transparency:
Here is what she told Bloomberg analyzing the ongoing recession and criticizing blurring financial accounting instead of increasing transparency:
Labels:
Bloomberg,
Diane Garnick,
Invesco,
mark to market
Saturday, April 4, 2009
Mark to Myth
So are we back to flair value and marking to myth? After months of badgering from Congress, America's accounting standard-setter has relented. Holders of financial instruments will now have more latitude to value them according to their own cash flow models, rather than using observable prices, when markets are "distressed" or "inactive".
US banks may be able to ease up on the huge charges for troubled assets they have taken for the past six quarters. Make no mistake - this was a rush job. But that the Financial Accounting Standards Board received more than 600 letters commenting on the proposals in the accelerated process shows investors at least had some say. That resulted in less wiggle room for banks wishing to disregard market prices, as well as more regular detailed disclosure of banks' methods in applying the rules.
The American Bankers Association, which pushed legislators to demand the board make changes, praised the board. “Today’s decision should improve information for investors by providing more accurate estimates of market values,” said Edward Yingling, the association’s president.
One change adopted by the board would require banks to disclose the effect of the changed interpretation, although the final wording has not been released and it is not clear how detailed that disclosure will be.
For some other assets, banks must write them down to market value only if they conclude that the decline is “other than temporary.” The measure that drew dissents will allow banks to keep part of such declines off their income statements, although the decline would still show on the institutions’ balance sheets.
One of the dissenters, Thomas J. Linsmeier, argued that accounting rules already allowed the “fiction all banks are well capitalized,” adding that the changes would “make them seem better capitalized.”
The vote drew condemnation from an organization called the Investors Working Group, and the two former S.E.C. chairman who lead it — William H. Donaldson, appointed by the second President Bush, and Arthur Levitt Jr., who served in the Clinton administration.
“In order to create high-quality accounting standards, it is critical that the process be independent and free from political pressure,” the group said in a statement. “This will ensure that such standards are neutral and faithfully represent economic reality. To the extent that these new FASB proposals reduce the free flow of transparent and reliable financial information, they undermine investor interests and weaken their ability to make sound investment decisions.”
(from Financial Times and New-York Times)
US banks may be able to ease up on the huge charges for troubled assets they have taken for the past six quarters. Make no mistake - this was a rush job. But that the Financial Accounting Standards Board received more than 600 letters commenting on the proposals in the accelerated process shows investors at least had some say. That resulted in less wiggle room for banks wishing to disregard market prices, as well as more regular detailed disclosure of banks' methods in applying the rules.
The American Bankers Association, which pushed legislators to demand the board make changes, praised the board. “Today’s decision should improve information for investors by providing more accurate estimates of market values,” said Edward Yingling, the association’s president.
One change adopted by the board would require banks to disclose the effect of the changed interpretation, although the final wording has not been released and it is not clear how detailed that disclosure will be.
For some other assets, banks must write them down to market value only if they conclude that the decline is “other than temporary.” The measure that drew dissents will allow banks to keep part of such declines off their income statements, although the decline would still show on the institutions’ balance sheets.
One of the dissenters, Thomas J. Linsmeier, argued that accounting rules already allowed the “fiction all banks are well capitalized,” adding that the changes would “make them seem better capitalized.”
The vote drew condemnation from an organization called the Investors Working Group, and the two former S.E.C. chairman who lead it — William H. Donaldson, appointed by the second President Bush, and Arthur Levitt Jr., who served in the Clinton administration.
“In order to create high-quality accounting standards, it is critical that the process be independent and free from political pressure,” the group said in a statement. “This will ensure that such standards are neutral and faithfully represent economic reality. To the extent that these new FASB proposals reduce the free flow of transparent and reliable financial information, they undermine investor interests and weaken their ability to make sound investment decisions.”
(from Financial Times and New-York Times)
Nassim Taleb: Geithner's Plan is Another Subsidy to the Wall Street
Nassim Taleb gave an interview to a Bloomberg television on April 1. Here are a few excerpts from it:
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s plan to remove toxic assets from bank balance sheets will fail to revitalize the financial system, “We’re heading in exactly the wrong direction,” “I want an overhaul, I want something drastic. This is going to fail, this is not it.”
Geithner has proposed to revive banks without resorting to nationalization through the Public-Private Investment Program that will buy difficult-to-value assets.
The Treasury’s plan is unfair to taxpayers and rewards the failure of banks that didn’t understand the risks they took when using debt to boost returns in the mortgage market.
“I don’t understand why I as a taxpayer need to subsidize those who failed, by giving them options so they can rebuild their balance sheets”. “Taxpayers take the downside and Wall Street as usual is going to take the upside, another classical problem of socializing the losses, privatizing the gains.”
It’s “shocking” that the government would allow banks to estimate the value of the toxic assets that remain on their books because there is effectively no market for the securities, making them almost impossible to value.
“I don’t understand letting banks mark to market, after all this incompetence.” “Why don’t we allow people to mark their house at what they think the value of their house is?”
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s plan to remove toxic assets from bank balance sheets will fail to revitalize the financial system, “We’re heading in exactly the wrong direction,” “I want an overhaul, I want something drastic. This is going to fail, this is not it.”
Geithner has proposed to revive banks without resorting to nationalization through the Public-Private Investment Program that will buy difficult-to-value assets.
The Treasury’s plan is unfair to taxpayers and rewards the failure of banks that didn’t understand the risks they took when using debt to boost returns in the mortgage market.
“I don’t understand why I as a taxpayer need to subsidize those who failed, by giving them options so they can rebuild their balance sheets”. “Taxpayers take the downside and Wall Street as usual is going to take the upside, another classical problem of socializing the losses, privatizing the gains.”
It’s “shocking” that the government would allow banks to estimate the value of the toxic assets that remain on their books because there is effectively no market for the securities, making them almost impossible to value.
“I don’t understand letting banks mark to market, after all this incompetence.” “Why don’t we allow people to mark their house at what they think the value of their house is?”
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