Rank: 1
James Simons
Renaissance Technologies
Est. 2008 earnings: $2.5 billion
Est. 2007 earnings: $2.8 billion
Rank: 2
John Paulson
Paulson & Company
Est. 2008 earnings: $2 billion
Est. 2007 earnings: $3.7 billion
Rank: 3
John D. Arnold
Centaurus Energy
Est. 2008 earnings: $1.5 billion
Est. 2007 earnings: $480 million
Rank: 4
George Soros
Soros Fund Management
Est. 2008 earnings: $1.1 billion
Est. 2007 earnings: $2.9 billion
Rank: 5
Ray Dalio
Bridgewater Associates
Est. 2008 earnings: $780 million
Est. 2007 earnings: $400 million
Rank: 6
Bruce Kovner
Caxton Associates
Est. 2008 earnings: $640 million
Est. 2007 earnings: $100 million
Rank: 7
David Shaw
D.E. Shaw & Company
Est. 2008 earnings: $275 million
Est. 2007 earnings: $210 million
Rank: 8
Stanley Druckenmiller
Duquesne Capital Management
Est. 2008 earnings: $260 million
Est. 2007 earnings: Not available
Rank: 9 (tie)
David Harding, left
Winton Capital Management
Est. 2008 earnings: $250 million
Est. 2007 earnings: $225 million
Rank: 9 (tie)
John Taylor Jr., right
FX Concepts
Est. 2008 earnings: $250 million
Est. 2007 earnings: Not available
Rank: 9 (tie)
Alan Howard, not pictured
Brevan Howard Asset Management
Est. 2008 earnings: $250 million
Est. 2007 earnings: $245 million
Source: Alpha Magazine
As major markets and economies careened downward last year, 25 top managers reaped a total of $11.6 billion in pay by trading above the pain in the markets, according to an annual ranking of top hedge fund earners by Institutional Investor’s Alpha magazine, which comes out Wednesday.
James H. Simons, a former math professor who has made billions year after year for the hedge fund Renaissance Technologies, earned $2.5 billion running computer-driven trading strategies. John A. Paulson, who rode to riches by betting against the housing market, came in second with reported gains of $2 billion. And George Soros, also a perennial name on the rich list of secretive moneymakers, pulled in $1.1 billion.
Of course, their earnings were not unscathed by the extensive shakeout in the markets. In a year when losses were recorded at two of every three hedge funds, pay for many of these managers was down by several million, and the overall pool of earnings was about half the $22.5 billion the top 25 earned in 2007.
The managers’ compensation, which was breathtaking in the best of times, is eye-popping after a year when hedge funds lost 18 percent on average, and investors withdrew money en masse.
Government scrutiny, over Wall Street pay and the role all kinds of institutions play in the financial markets, is also mounting. Hedge funds are facing proposals for new taxes on their gains, and on Tuesday, Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said he would seek greater power to regulate hedge funds.
Some people on the list disputed Alpha’s calculations, which are estimates that include the increase in value of personal investments the managers made in their funds. But none offered different values for their bonuses or the soaring wealth in their funds.
To make the cut this year, a hedge fund hotshot needed to earn $75 million, down sharply from the $360 million cutoff for 2007’s top 25. Still, amid the financial shakeout, the combined pay of the top 25 hedge fund managers beat every year before 2006.
“The golden age for hedge funds is gone, but it’s still three times more lucrative than working at a mutual fund and most other places on Wall Street,” said Robert Sloan, managing partner of S3 Partners, a hedge fund risk management firm. “But this shouldn’t pop up on the greed meter. They made money. That’s what they’re supposed to.”
In an interview, Mr. Paulson — whose lofty 2008 earnings were down from the $3.7 billion that Alpha estimated he earned in 2007 — said his pay was high in large part because he is the biggest investor in his fund. In fact, he said he receives no bonus. The pensions, endowments and other institutions that invest in his fund do not mind the hefty cut of profits he and his team take, he said.
“In a year when all their other investments lost money, we’re like an oasis,” Mr. Paulson said.
“We have investors who were invested with Madoff, and they can’t thank me enough,” he added, referring to the disgraced financier Bernard L. Madoff.
Even as the spotlight intensifies, these hedge fund managers and others who made it through last year with cash on hand are the sort of investors the federal government hopes will step in and buy troubled assets from banks. The richest managers are also in the best position to take advantage of the distressed environment to build their wealth.
“The guys who own the future are the guys like John Paulson and the others on the Alpha list,” said Keith R. McCullough, the chief executive of Research Edge, a firm in New Haven that provides trading analysis for hedge funds. “Ironically enough, we’re going to go beg for capital from the very people we’ve been trying to vilify.” Mr. Paulson, though, said he did not plan to participate in the new public-private investment program.
One hedge fund manager on the list, Paul Touradji, said he understood the public outcry against people who are paid regardless of whether they earned money for their clients. “Wall Street should get paid only when they reward their clients,” he said. “For every dollar we made, our clients earned multiples.”
Mr. Touradji, $140 million richer than in 2007, according to Alpha, said he gave his investors advice by sharing strategies — something rare in the black-box hedge fund world. Last year, for instance, he spotted the commodities bubble early and warned his investors, which include pension funds and endowments, to reshuffle their other holdings, saving them from losses.
Some hedge funds made so much that they had two people on the list. While Mr. Simons of Renaissance Technologies landed the No. 1 spot, one of his partners, Henry B. Laufer, is also on the list with earnings of $125 million.
A spokesman for Mr. Simons declined to comment.
John D. Arnold, an energy trader in his early 30s who was third on the list, with $1.5 billion, did not respond to a request for comment. A spokesman for George Soros, Michael Vachon, said his boss gave away more than half his earnings in 2008. A spokesman for Raymond T. Dalio, who is said to have earned $780 million, said his boss had made so much money because he anticipated the crisis.
Two of the three managers who tied for ninth, at $250 million, are based in Britain: David Harding of Winton Capital and Alan Howard of Brevan Howard Asset Management. A second employee of Brevan Howard, Christopher Rokos, also made the list.
Mr. Harding, who runs Winton, said his success last year was part luck, part knowledge from 25 years of hard work in which he often struck a solitary path in a type of trading that had many naysayers. “It is nice to have a golden life and a purpose to engage in, a reason to go to work,” said Mr. Harding, who doubted that many people would be willing or able to do his job. “Obviously I wouldn’t have set out to be a futures trader if I hadn’t wanted to make a lot of money.”
John R. Taylor, the third hedge fund manager who tied as ninth on the list, said even winning hedge funds should acknowledge that they had benefited from the government’s bailout of the banking system. “Thank God for the government, because if they hadn’t intervened, we wouldn’t have had anybody to trade with,” said Mr. Taylor, who has run his currency fund, FX Concepts, since the 1980s.
But he said he was not grateful to be on Alpha’s list, which he said overestimated his pay by a multiple of five. The last time he received lots of publicity, Mr. Taylor said, was in 1993, and that preceded his worst year ever.
“This is bad luck with the trading gods,” Mr. Taylor said. “We’re doomed next year if you write about us.”
(from NYT, March 25, 2009)
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Global Currency in Development at G20
A single clause in Point 19 of the communiqué issued by the G20 leaders amounts to revolution in the global financial order.
"We have agreed to support a general SDR allocation which will inject $250bn (£170bn) into the world economy and increase global liquidity," it said. SDRs are Special Drawing Rights, a synthetic paper currency issued by the International Monetary Fund that has lain dormant for half a century.
In effect, the G20 leaders have activated the IMF's power to create money and begin global "quantitative easing". In doing so, they are putting a de facto world currency into play. It is outside the control of any sovereign body. Conspiracy theorists will love it.
It has been a good summit for the IMF. Its fighting fund for crises is to be tripled overnight to $750bn. This is real money.
There is now a world currency in waiting. In time, SDRs are likely evolve into a parking place for the foreign holdings of central banks, led by the People's Bank of China. Beijing's moves this week to offer $95bn in yuan currency swaps to developing economies show how fast China aims to break dollar dependence.
Hedge funds deemed "systemically important" will come under draconian restraints. How this is enforced will determine whether Mayfair's hedge-fund industry – 80pc of all European funds are there – will continue to flourish.
It seems that hedge funds have been designated for ritual sacrifice, even though they played no more than a cameo role in the genesis of this crisis. It was not they who took on extreme debt leverage: it was the banks – up to 30 times in the US and nearer 60 times for some in Europe that used off-books "conduits" to increase their bets. The market process itself is sorting this out in any case – brutally – forcing banks to wind down their leverage. The problem right now is that this is happening too fast.
But to the extent that this G20 accord makes it impossible for the "shadow banking" to resurrect itself in the next inevitable cycle of risk appetite, it may prevent another disaster of this kind.
The key phrase is "new rules aimed at avoiding excessive leverage and forcing banks to put more money aside during good times." This is more or less what the authorities agreed after the Depression. Complacency chipped away at the rules as the decades passed. It is the human condition, and we can't change that.
(from Telegraph, April 7, 2009)
"We have agreed to support a general SDR allocation which will inject $250bn (£170bn) into the world economy and increase global liquidity," it said. SDRs are Special Drawing Rights, a synthetic paper currency issued by the International Monetary Fund that has lain dormant for half a century.
In effect, the G20 leaders have activated the IMF's power to create money and begin global "quantitative easing". In doing so, they are putting a de facto world currency into play. It is outside the control of any sovereign body. Conspiracy theorists will love it.
It has been a good summit for the IMF. Its fighting fund for crises is to be tripled overnight to $750bn. This is real money.
There is now a world currency in waiting. In time, SDRs are likely evolve into a parking place for the foreign holdings of central banks, led by the People's Bank of China. Beijing's moves this week to offer $95bn in yuan currency swaps to developing economies show how fast China aims to break dollar dependence.
Hedge funds deemed "systemically important" will come under draconian restraints. How this is enforced will determine whether Mayfair's hedge-fund industry – 80pc of all European funds are there – will continue to flourish.
It seems that hedge funds have been designated for ritual sacrifice, even though they played no more than a cameo role in the genesis of this crisis. It was not they who took on extreme debt leverage: it was the banks – up to 30 times in the US and nearer 60 times for some in Europe that used off-books "conduits" to increase their bets. The market process itself is sorting this out in any case – brutally – forcing banks to wind down their leverage. The problem right now is that this is happening too fast.
But to the extent that this G20 accord makes it impossible for the "shadow banking" to resurrect itself in the next inevitable cycle of risk appetite, it may prevent another disaster of this kind.
The key phrase is "new rules aimed at avoiding excessive leverage and forcing banks to put more money aside during good times." This is more or less what the authorities agreed after the Depression. Complacency chipped away at the rules as the decades passed. It is the human condition, and we can't change that.
(from Telegraph, April 7, 2009)
Labels:
G20,
Global Currency,
IMF,
SDR,
Special Drawing Rights
Akerlof and Shiller: "There was nothing rational, well informed or unemotional about the behavior that has all but collapsed the economy"
Look around you, George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller say. The second coming of the Great Depression is, like the original, a direct result of animal spirits. If only we had factored those turbulent emotions into economic theory, we might not be repeating the earlier tragedy.
Akerlof, a Nobel laureate, and Shiller, a good bet to become one, are prominent mainstream economists. They don’t deviate easily from orthodox theory, with its allegiance to the proposition that people are essentially rational, well informed and unemotional in the numerous transactions that shape the economy. But in “Animal Spirits,” they have deviated — and they have done so just as mainstream theory self-destructs.
There was nothing rational, well informed or unemotional about the behavior that has all but collapsed the economy. That leaves most of America’s economists without a believable framework for explaining how we got into this mess. Akerlof and Shiller are the first to try to rework economic theory for our times. The effort itself makes their book a milestone.
Keynes performed a similar service in the 1930s — mainly by making the point that market economies could suffer long periods of high unemployment and low output unless government stepped in to supply the necessary demand. Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus program reflects his insight.
But another aspect of Keynes’s thinking did not fare well. He also introduced the world to “animal spirits,” coining that phrase to describe a range of emotions, human impulses, enthusiasms and misperceptions that drive economies — and ultimately unwind them. The economists who interpreted Keynes “rooted out almost all of the animal spirits — the noneconomic motives and irrational behaviors — that lay at the heart of his explanation for the Great Depression,” Akerlof and Shiller declare.
Addressing this wrong, the authors attempt to restore animal spirits to economic theory. They do this by drawing on the greater understanding of human psychology that exists today, and which Akerlof and Shiller, along with other economists, have incorporated into the relatively new field of behavioral economics.
Until now, behavioral economics has focused mainly on a variety of disparate traits that chip away at the assumption of rationality embedded in mainstream theory. A young person, for example, fails to join a 401(k) plan, even one subsidized by his employer, although if he were rational and fully informed, he would certainly sign up.
What Akerlof and Shiller do is to highlight this sort of finding, packaging it with numerous other psychological insights into a half-dozen broad maxims that permanently alter the concept of rational behavior. And their book takes their case not just to economists, but also to the general reader. It is short (176 pages of text) and easy enough for laymen to understand (most of the time).
Above all, they challenge the reigning free-market ideology of the past 30 years or so, from the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to the abrupt arrival of the present crisis late last year. That ideology held that markets should operate free of government because they were rational. But if animal spirits influence behavior, then government must play a broad, disciplinary role, and do so permanently.
Akerlof and Shiller spent five years writing “Animal Spirits” and honing that conviction. They are concerned that once we enter a revival, pressure will inevitably build — just as it did in the late 1970s, more than a generation after the Great Depression — to give the markets free rein again. Akerlof and Shiller intend their book as an obstacle to that ever happening.
“The system of safeguards developed from the experience of the Great Depression has been eroded,” they write. “It is therefore necessary for us to renew our understanding of how capitalist economies — in which people have not only rational economic motives but also all kinds of animal spirits — really work.”
Both men are old hands at prodding their fellow economists into recognizing exceptions to mainstream theory. Akerlof, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, shared a Nobel Prize in 2001 for his work on “asymmetric information,” which means that some parties to a transaction know more about the deal than others, like the used-car salesman who knows more about the shortcomings of the vehicle he is trying to sell than the customer he is pitching. Lemon laws, protecting consumers, grew out of such findings. Akerlof has long believed that in most market situations a government role can improve the outcome. “Animal Spirits” brings that view to a high boil.
Shiller, a Yale professor, originated the phrase “irrational exuberance” before Alan Greenspan made it famous, and in his research he has documented the rise and fall of home prices going back decades, to demonstrate that the latest surge was far and away the greatest in American history. The bubble will burst with very unpleasant results, Shiller warned, well before that actually happened.
What are these animal spirits that drive the American economy? Confidence is one. Far from dispassionately weighing and analyzing all the options, people act on the confidence, or overconfidence, that a home they are about to buy will be worth more a year later. Confidence drove up stock prices in the 1920s and again in this decade, far more than corporate balance sheets and pure reason would justify, and now lack of confidence, spreading like a contagious disease, is exacerbating the sell-off.
Fairness also shows up as an animal spirit, influencing thousands of decisions in ways that part company with standard theory. Out of a sense of fairness, for example, bosses often pay their employees more than the market demands. “Considerations of fairness are a major motivator in many economic decisions,” Akerlof and Shiller write, “and are related to our sense of confidence and our ability to work effectively together.”
Corruption, too, is an animal spirit. This includes the propensity to produce not just what people really need but what they think they need, like the mortgage-backed securities, “a modern form of snake oil,” the authors declare.
In their list of animal spirits, the two economists pay special attention to the tendency of people to think in terms of narratives or stories. “High confidence tends to be associated with inspirational stories, stories about new business initiatives, tales of how others are getting rich,” the authors write. On the other hand, stories about the Great Depression shape our narrative of what is happening now, and our behavior.
So what is to be done? Animal spirits are human emotions; they can’t be turned off. Unchecked, they drive the economy into misbegotten booms and disastrous busts. Tempered by government, on the other hand, they are a great source of entrepreneurial energy, safely channeled into a healthy capitalism. Keynes came to that conclusion, and Akerlof and Shiller, in “Animal Spirits,” push hard in the same direction — prodding their colleagues to follow their lead in revamping economic theory to deal with a market system that, quite irrationally, failed to govern itself.
(from NYT, April 17, 2009
Akerlof, a Nobel laureate, and Shiller, a good bet to become one, are prominent mainstream economists. They don’t deviate easily from orthodox theory, with its allegiance to the proposition that people are essentially rational, well informed and unemotional in the numerous transactions that shape the economy. But in “Animal Spirits,” they have deviated — and they have done so just as mainstream theory self-destructs.
There was nothing rational, well informed or unemotional about the behavior that has all but collapsed the economy. That leaves most of America’s economists without a believable framework for explaining how we got into this mess. Akerlof and Shiller are the first to try to rework economic theory for our times. The effort itself makes their book a milestone.
Keynes performed a similar service in the 1930s — mainly by making the point that market economies could suffer long periods of high unemployment and low output unless government stepped in to supply the necessary demand. Barack Obama’s $787 billion stimulus program reflects his insight.
But another aspect of Keynes’s thinking did not fare well. He also introduced the world to “animal spirits,” coining that phrase to describe a range of emotions, human impulses, enthusiasms and misperceptions that drive economies — and ultimately unwind them. The economists who interpreted Keynes “rooted out almost all of the animal spirits — the noneconomic motives and irrational behaviors — that lay at the heart of his explanation for the Great Depression,” Akerlof and Shiller declare.
Addressing this wrong, the authors attempt to restore animal spirits to economic theory. They do this by drawing on the greater understanding of human psychology that exists today, and which Akerlof and Shiller, along with other economists, have incorporated into the relatively new field of behavioral economics.
Until now, behavioral economics has focused mainly on a variety of disparate traits that chip away at the assumption of rationality embedded in mainstream theory. A young person, for example, fails to join a 401(k) plan, even one subsidized by his employer, although if he were rational and fully informed, he would certainly sign up.
What Akerlof and Shiller do is to highlight this sort of finding, packaging it with numerous other psychological insights into a half-dozen broad maxims that permanently alter the concept of rational behavior. And their book takes their case not just to economists, but also to the general reader. It is short (176 pages of text) and easy enough for laymen to understand (most of the time).
Above all, they challenge the reigning free-market ideology of the past 30 years or so, from the rise of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to the abrupt arrival of the present crisis late last year. That ideology held that markets should operate free of government because they were rational. But if animal spirits influence behavior, then government must play a broad, disciplinary role, and do so permanently.
Akerlof and Shiller spent five years writing “Animal Spirits” and honing that conviction. They are concerned that once we enter a revival, pressure will inevitably build — just as it did in the late 1970s, more than a generation after the Great Depression — to give the markets free rein again. Akerlof and Shiller intend their book as an obstacle to that ever happening.
“The system of safeguards developed from the experience of the Great Depression has been eroded,” they write. “It is therefore necessary for us to renew our understanding of how capitalist economies — in which people have not only rational economic motives but also all kinds of animal spirits — really work.”
Both men are old hands at prodding their fellow economists into recognizing exceptions to mainstream theory. Akerlof, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, shared a Nobel Prize in 2001 for his work on “asymmetric information,” which means that some parties to a transaction know more about the deal than others, like the used-car salesman who knows more about the shortcomings of the vehicle he is trying to sell than the customer he is pitching. Lemon laws, protecting consumers, grew out of such findings. Akerlof has long believed that in most market situations a government role can improve the outcome. “Animal Spirits” brings that view to a high boil.
Shiller, a Yale professor, originated the phrase “irrational exuberance” before Alan Greenspan made it famous, and in his research he has documented the rise and fall of home prices going back decades, to demonstrate that the latest surge was far and away the greatest in American history. The bubble will burst with very unpleasant results, Shiller warned, well before that actually happened.
What are these animal spirits that drive the American economy? Confidence is one. Far from dispassionately weighing and analyzing all the options, people act on the confidence, or overconfidence, that a home they are about to buy will be worth more a year later. Confidence drove up stock prices in the 1920s and again in this decade, far more than corporate balance sheets and pure reason would justify, and now lack of confidence, spreading like a contagious disease, is exacerbating the sell-off.
Fairness also shows up as an animal spirit, influencing thousands of decisions in ways that part company with standard theory. Out of a sense of fairness, for example, bosses often pay their employees more than the market demands. “Considerations of fairness are a major motivator in many economic decisions,” Akerlof and Shiller write, “and are related to our sense of confidence and our ability to work effectively together.”
Corruption, too, is an animal spirit. This includes the propensity to produce not just what people really need but what they think they need, like the mortgage-backed securities, “a modern form of snake oil,” the authors declare.
In their list of animal spirits, the two economists pay special attention to the tendency of people to think in terms of narratives or stories. “High confidence tends to be associated with inspirational stories, stories about new business initiatives, tales of how others are getting rich,” the authors write. On the other hand, stories about the Great Depression shape our narrative of what is happening now, and our behavior.
So what is to be done? Animal spirits are human emotions; they can’t be turned off. Unchecked, they drive the economy into misbegotten booms and disastrous busts. Tempered by government, on the other hand, they are a great source of entrepreneurial energy, safely channeled into a healthy capitalism. Keynes came to that conclusion, and Akerlof and Shiller, in “Animal Spirits,” push hard in the same direction — prodding their colleagues to follow their lead in revamping economic theory to deal with a market system that, quite irrationally, failed to govern itself.
(from NYT, April 17, 2009
Stiglitz Interview on U.S. Banks: TARP as a Strange Partnership and Hidden Subsidy
Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz talks with Bloomberg's Kathleen Hays about the U.S. government's Troubled Asset Relief Program for banks. Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank and a professor of economics at Columbia University, also discusses the government's stress tests for banks and the Obama administration's strategy to bolster banks’ balance sheets to spearhead a recovery in an economy facing its longest recession in at least a quarter century.
Watch Stiglitz Interview
Watch Stiglitz Interview
Why Joseph Stiglitz doesn't like the TARP
What strikes me about the TARP is that the banks choose which assets to dump. Therefore, the taxpayers will hold the worthless assets.
The Obama administration’s bank-rescue efforts will probably fail because the programs have been designed to help Wall Street rather than create a viable financial system, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
“All the ingredients they have so far are weak, and there are several missing ingredients,” Stiglitz said in an interview yesterday. The people who designed the plans are “either in the pocket of the banks or they’re incompetent.”
The Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, isn’t large enough to recapitalize the banking system, and the administration hasn’t been direct in addressing that shortfall, he said. Stiglitz said there are conflicts of interest at the White House because some of Obama’s advisers have close ties to Wall Street.
“We don’t have enough money, they don’t want to go back to Congress, and they don’t want to do it in an open way and they don’t want to get control” of the banks, a set of constraints that will guarantee failure, Stiglitz said.
The return to taxpayers from the TARP is as low as 25 cents on the dollar, he said. “The bank restructuring has been an absolute mess.”
Rather than continually buying small stakes in banks, the government should put weaker banks through a receivership where the shareholders of the banks are wiped out and the bondholders become the shareholders, using taxpayer money to keep the institutions functioning, he said.
Stiglitz, 66, won the Nobel in 2001 for showing that markets are inefficient when all parties in a transaction don’t have equal access to critical information, which is most of the time. His work is cited in more economic papers than that of any of his peers, according to a February ranking by Research Papers in Economics, an international database.
Financial shares have rallied in the past month as Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc. all reported better-than-expected earnings in the first quarter. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Financials Index has soared 91 percent from its low of 78.45 on March 6.
The Public-Private Investment Program, PPIP, designed to buy bad assets from banks, “is a really bad program,” Stiglitz said. It won’t accomplish the administration’s goal of establishing a price for illiquid assets clogging banks’ balance sheets, and instead will enrich investors while sticking taxpayers with huge losses, he said.
“You’re really bailing out the shareholders and the bondholders,” he said. “Some of the people likely to be involved in this, like Pimco, are big bondholders,” he said, referring to Pacific Investment Management Co., a bond investment firm in Newport Beach, California.
Stiglitz said taxpayer losses are likely to be much larger than bank profits from the PPIP program even though Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair has said the agency expects no losses.
“The statement from Sheila Bair that there’s no risk is absurd,” he said, because losses from the PPIP will be borne by the FDIC, which is funded by member banks.
Andrew Gray, an FDIC spokesman, said Bair never said there would be no risk, only that the agency had “zero expected cost” from the program.
“We’re going to be asking all the banks, including presumably some healthy banks, to pay for the losses of the bad banks,” Stiglitz said. “It’s a real redistribution and a tax on all American savers.”
Stiglitz was also concerned about the links between White House advisers and Wall Street. Hedge fund D.E. Shaw & Co. paid National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers, a managing director of the firm, more than $5 million in salary and other compensation in the 16 months before he joined the administration. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
“America has had a revolving door. People go from Wall Street to Treasury and back to Wall Street,” he said. “Even if there is no quid pro quo, that is not the issue. The issue is the mindset.”
Stiglitz was head of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers under President Bill Clinton before serving from 1997 to 2000 as chief economist at the World Bank. He resigned from that post in 2000 after repeatedly clashing with the White House over economic policies it supported at the International Monetary Fund. He is now a professor at Columbia University.
Stiglitz was also critical of Obama’s other economic rescue programs.
He called the $787 billion stimulus program necessary but “flawed” because too much spending comes after 2009, and because it devotes too much of the money to tax cuts “which aren’t likely to work very effectively.”
“It’s really a peculiar policy, I think,” he said.
The $75 billion mortgage relief program, meanwhile, doesn’t do enough to help Americans who can’t afford to make their monthly payments, he said. It doesn’t reduce principal, doesn’t make changes in bankruptcy law that would help people work out debts, and doesn’t change the incentive to simply stop making payments once a mortgage is greater than the value of a house.
Stiglitz said the Fed, while it’s done almost all it can to bring the country back from the worst recession since 1982, can’t revive the economy on its own.
Relying on low interest rates to help put a floor under housing prices is a variation on the policies that created the housing bubble in the first place, Stiglitz said.
“This is a strategy trying to recreate that bubble,” he said. “That’s not likely to provide a long-run solution. It’s a solution that says let’s kick the can down the road a little bit.”
While the strategy might put a floor under housing prices, it won’t do anything to speed the recovery, he said. “It’s a recipe for Japanese-style malaise.”
Even with rates low, banks may not lend because they remain wary of market or borrower risk, and in the current environment “there’s still a lot of risk.” That’s why even with all of the programs the Fed and the administration have opened, lending is still very limited, Stiglitz said.
“They haven’t thought enough about the determinants of the flow of credit and lending.”
(from Bloomberg, April 17, 2009)
The Obama administration’s bank-rescue efforts will probably fail because the programs have been designed to help Wall Street rather than create a viable financial system, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
“All the ingredients they have so far are weak, and there are several missing ingredients,” Stiglitz said in an interview yesterday. The people who designed the plans are “either in the pocket of the banks or they’re incompetent.”
The Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, isn’t large enough to recapitalize the banking system, and the administration hasn’t been direct in addressing that shortfall, he said. Stiglitz said there are conflicts of interest at the White House because some of Obama’s advisers have close ties to Wall Street.
“We don’t have enough money, they don’t want to go back to Congress, and they don’t want to do it in an open way and they don’t want to get control” of the banks, a set of constraints that will guarantee failure, Stiglitz said.
The return to taxpayers from the TARP is as low as 25 cents on the dollar, he said. “The bank restructuring has been an absolute mess.”
Rather than continually buying small stakes in banks, the government should put weaker banks through a receivership where the shareholders of the banks are wiped out and the bondholders become the shareholders, using taxpayer money to keep the institutions functioning, he said.
Stiglitz, 66, won the Nobel in 2001 for showing that markets are inefficient when all parties in a transaction don’t have equal access to critical information, which is most of the time. His work is cited in more economic papers than that of any of his peers, according to a February ranking by Research Papers in Economics, an international database.
Financial shares have rallied in the past month as Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc. all reported better-than-expected earnings in the first quarter. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Financials Index has soared 91 percent from its low of 78.45 on March 6.
The Public-Private Investment Program, PPIP, designed to buy bad assets from banks, “is a really bad program,” Stiglitz said. It won’t accomplish the administration’s goal of establishing a price for illiquid assets clogging banks’ balance sheets, and instead will enrich investors while sticking taxpayers with huge losses, he said.
“You’re really bailing out the shareholders and the bondholders,” he said. “Some of the people likely to be involved in this, like Pimco, are big bondholders,” he said, referring to Pacific Investment Management Co., a bond investment firm in Newport Beach, California.
Stiglitz said taxpayer losses are likely to be much larger than bank profits from the PPIP program even though Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair has said the agency expects no losses.
“The statement from Sheila Bair that there’s no risk is absurd,” he said, because losses from the PPIP will be borne by the FDIC, which is funded by member banks.
Andrew Gray, an FDIC spokesman, said Bair never said there would be no risk, only that the agency had “zero expected cost” from the program.
“We’re going to be asking all the banks, including presumably some healthy banks, to pay for the losses of the bad banks,” Stiglitz said. “It’s a real redistribution and a tax on all American savers.”
Stiglitz was also concerned about the links between White House advisers and Wall Street. Hedge fund D.E. Shaw & Co. paid National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers, a managing director of the firm, more than $5 million in salary and other compensation in the 16 months before he joined the administration. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank.
“America has had a revolving door. People go from Wall Street to Treasury and back to Wall Street,” he said. “Even if there is no quid pro quo, that is not the issue. The issue is the mindset.”
Stiglitz was head of the White House’s Council of Economic Advisers under President Bill Clinton before serving from 1997 to 2000 as chief economist at the World Bank. He resigned from that post in 2000 after repeatedly clashing with the White House over economic policies it supported at the International Monetary Fund. He is now a professor at Columbia University.
Stiglitz was also critical of Obama’s other economic rescue programs.
He called the $787 billion stimulus program necessary but “flawed” because too much spending comes after 2009, and because it devotes too much of the money to tax cuts “which aren’t likely to work very effectively.”
“It’s really a peculiar policy, I think,” he said.
The $75 billion mortgage relief program, meanwhile, doesn’t do enough to help Americans who can’t afford to make their monthly payments, he said. It doesn’t reduce principal, doesn’t make changes in bankruptcy law that would help people work out debts, and doesn’t change the incentive to simply stop making payments once a mortgage is greater than the value of a house.
Stiglitz said the Fed, while it’s done almost all it can to bring the country back from the worst recession since 1982, can’t revive the economy on its own.
Relying on low interest rates to help put a floor under housing prices is a variation on the policies that created the housing bubble in the first place, Stiglitz said.
“This is a strategy trying to recreate that bubble,” he said. “That’s not likely to provide a long-run solution. It’s a solution that says let’s kick the can down the road a little bit.”
While the strategy might put a floor under housing prices, it won’t do anything to speed the recovery, he said. “It’s a recipe for Japanese-style malaise.”
Even with rates low, banks may not lend because they remain wary of market or borrower risk, and in the current environment “there’s still a lot of risk.” That’s why even with all of the programs the Fed and the administration have opened, lending is still very limited, Stiglitz said.
“They haven’t thought enough about the determinants of the flow of credit and lending.”
(from Bloomberg, April 17, 2009)
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